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Preface
The unauthorized use of force in Iraq by the coalition forces and the establishment
of a transitional authority following the occupation of Iraq by the occupying powers
raised serious concerns for the appearance of legitimacy under international law. As
scholars have called this period of uncertainty 'cross roads' 1, this event calls for a precise
legal analysis. As a student of International Law I find it irresistible to undertake an indepth research on this phenomenon. I shall to this end conduct and present a thorough
investigation of the Transitional Authority in Iraq, its legitimacy, governance and seek to
identify potential contribution to the progressive development of international law in this
field.
Besides, my personal interest in the Iraqi events played a role in selecting this
topic. Freedom, war, and democracy- these words have simply been integral part of my
regular life as I was growing up in Bangladesh. The fact of being the first generation of a
new country came with its demands. I witnessed nostalgia about the freedom struggle,
survival stories during the war, almost fifteen years of military dictatorship and uprising
and sacrifice of common people for democracy. The ordeal of Iraqi people and the future
of this vibrant culture attracted me to study their journey to a new political reality. My
two and half years' stay in the Middle East has played a role in deciding to work with this
subject.
By any standard, this is as sensitive a political topic as it is a legal one. Though I
tried to analyze without partisan bias, at times I have taken sides. As one of the most
1

Sompong Sucharitkul, International law at the crossroads, 13 th Regional Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, March 12, 2004, San Francisco.
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influential historians in the US Howard Zinn wrote, "You can't be neutral on a moving
train" - I did not try to be one. I have voiced my support for the law above everything else.

It is my great pleasure to thank the members of my committee; my advisors

Professor Christian Okeke and Professor Michael Van Walt for their support and
inspiration over the years. I am indebted to my Supervisor Distinguished Professor
Sompong Sucharitkul for his endless contribution to this work as well as my
understanding of international law in general.

My heartfelt thanks go to John Pluebell of GGU International Student
Services for his ever smiling helpfulness. My deepest appreciation for all my friends in
the Bay Area who helped me survives spiritually. And last but not the least I thank the
most favorite men in my life -my brother Kamrul Hassan, spouse Pablo Barua and my
two month young son Duronto Pablo, without whom I might have given up a long time
ago.

I hope this dissertation contributes to the growing study of transitional
authorities in international law. This work has been my love made visible (As put by
Kahlil Gibran) and I wish to continue my efforts in this regard.

3
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Chapter I

Transitional Authority in International Law and the
Relevance of the Iraqi Case

6

Introduction:
'Transitional Authority' can be described as one of the most recent phenomenon
in international law. It is the authority, exercised by a party other than the legitimate
sovereign, over a territory for a limited period of time. In the absence of a formal
definition, precedence could be considered as providing the mandate of the authority.
Thus it can be accurately defined as 'the unique legitimate body and source of authority
in which throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity' of
the territory in question 'are enshrined,2 as well as the administrative body which is
'empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority including the
administration of justice,3.From the definition arises a two fold characteristic of a
transitional Authority namely, its temporary nature during a transitional period and its
exercise of sovereign authorities and discharge of corresponding responsibilities. The
Transitional period may have been the result of an internal conflict or an international
intervention; international law has not crystallized a specific set of rules in this regard and
merely prescribes the necessary authority on a case-by-case basis. In this crucial period of
progressive development of international law in the area of transitional authority, the
world has witnessed an unprecedented situation in Iraq, which through the acts of
bringing about the interim government challenges the sovereign equality of States
assured by the United Nations. The unauthorized use of force was condemned by the
United Nations despite the promise of cooperation for rebuilding the nation.
Subsequently-the UN has authorized the Transitional A~thority and joined the efforts to
reinstate a permanent governing body. The Legitimacy and authority of this Transitional
2
3

SC Resolution 745 (1992) establishing United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.
SC Resolution 1272 (1999) establishing United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor.
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Government in Iraq as well as its contribution to the development of international law
will be examined in this study.
Though there is no codification of the rules of governance by the United Nations
or other international bodies, international law has come a long way to confront and
manage conflict situations. The colonial rules have mostly ended

4

before international

law was institutionalized through the formation of the United Nations in 1945. Thus
formally the UN never encountered the clashes of sovereignty issues. Though the UN
Charter establishes 'sovereign equality of all its Members,5, it has permitted deviation
from the principle of non-interference in times of extraordinary events and to act
accordingll. Prior to the end of the Cold War, The United Nations had frequently been
involved in the monitoring of borders and cease-fires as well as conducting or monitoring
the process of elections. The UN also assumed responsibility for the territories, (detached
from enemy States as a result of World War IT), previously under the mandate of the
League of the Nations in accordance with the Trusteeship system7 • Authorized by chapter
XIT of the Charter, it administered Irian Jaya (western New Guinea) for seven months
during the transition from Dutch colonial rule to Indonesian control in 1962-1963
pursuant to an agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands 8 . The UN also asserted
the right to govern Namibia when the General Assembly terminated the trusteeship of
South, a mandate established under the League of Nations and provided to set up a
council for Namibia for governing purposes9 .

: With few exceptions like Hong Kong, Puerto Rico, Samoa etc
6 Article 2.1 of the UN Charter
Article 39-51 of the UN Charter
7 Art.
8
rcle 75-85 of the UN Charter
9 Agreement concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), Aug 15, 1962, Indo.-Neth., 437 UNTS 274
GA Res. 2248, UN GAOR, 5th Spec. Sess., Supp No 1, at 1, UN Doc. A16657 (1967)
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Since the end of the Cold War a decade or two ago, there has been tremendous
development in the UN as a global organization exercising authority in a number of new
ways to address conflict situations and to cope with their consequences. These new
measures came in the form of the use of force to end interstate and internal violence

1o

such as in the case of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, intervention
in Haiti in 1990, protection of civilians in Rwanda in 1994; and enforcement of Dayton
Accords in the Former Yugoslavia in 1995. The UN stepped forward to resolve boundary
issues between Iraq and Kuwait in 1991 11 as well as to create international criminal
tribunals for former Yugoslavia in 1993 12 and for Rwanda in 199413 in order to prosecute
violations of international humanitarian law. Compensation for victims of Persian Gulf
conflict has also caught international attention 14. However authoritative these measures
may have been, they were not governing acts or governance in the true sense of the word.
The first major UN exercise in governance came with the formation of the UN
Transitory Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) , an institution created by the 1991
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement ofthe Conflict in Cambodia15 . There
was also the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) created "under
United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences,,16. The mission of

SC Res.678, UN SCOR, 45 th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 27, UN Doc. SIINF/46 (1990), reprinted in 29 ILM
1565 (1990) ; SC Res. 929, UN SCOR, 49 th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 10, UN Doc. SIINF/50 (1994);SC
Res.940, id at 51; SC Res. 1031 UN SCOR, 50th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 18,UN Doc. SIINF/51 (1995),
r~printed in 35 ILM 251 (1996) .
. SC Res. 687, UN SCOR, 46 th Sess., Res. &Dec., at 11, paras. 2-4, UN DOC. SIINF/47 (1991), reprinted
!~ 30 ILM 847 (1991).
SC Res. 827, UN SCOR, 48 th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 29, UN Doc. SIINF/49 (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM
~203 (1993).
th
14 SC Res. 955, UN SCOR, 49 Sess., supra note 1 at 15, reprinted in 33 ILM 1602 (1994).
SC Res. 687, supra note 7, paras. 16-19,
10

15

Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct 23, 1991, Art. 6 &

~nnex1, 31 ILM 183, 184 (1992).
SC Res. 1244 (1999).
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the international civil presence was unprecedented in scope and complexityl? and it ended
the reluctance of the UN to assume governing responsibilities in conflict stricken
territories. Within months of the advent of the UNMIK, the UN Security Council faced
Ie)

an emergency situation in East Timor encouraging the

formation~r;nother institution of a

similar kind. Thus, the Security Council established the UN Transitional Administration
in East Timor (UNT AET), with "overall responsibility for the administration of East
Timor", empowered "to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the
administration of justice"l8. In Afghanistan, the world has witnessed yet another more
matured Transitional Authority brought about by the international community after using
force under the guise of the principle of State responsibilityl9.
This gradual development of the principle and practice of the 'Transitional
Authority' in international law raises many legal questions on the face of it. Whether
there is in fact adequate legal authority for UN actions in such cases. It is unclear whether
UN has the necessary legal authority to assume the character and scope of the governance
functions it has assumed. The exercise of governance may represent an impermissible
interference with State sovereignty.

20

The institution of an authority in Iraq has further

complicated the issue. There arises further query as to whether the transitional authority
created by an occupying force can operate with undoubted validity in conformity with
international norms. It is difficult to justify such an institution on the notion of
sovereignty. It is difficult to define the role of the UN in this situation. The suffice of this
dissertation is to dissect the 'Fransitional Authority in Iraq, examine its legitimacy and

. hael Matheson, United Nations Governance of Post conflict Societies, 95 Am. J. Int'l. L. 79 (2001).
M Ie
19 SC Res. 1272 (1999).
20 http://www.state.gov/p/salris/6675.htm
Supra note 17 at 84.
17
18
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governance and seek to identify its contribution to the growing jurisprudence of
international law .
The degree or extent of the jurisdiction or sovereign authority of the Transitional
Authorities is a pressing issue for discussion. Traditionally the mandates of TA has
included the duty of maintaining law and order, to establish effective administration,
rehabilitation of the infra structure as well as to oversee all aspects of Human Rights
improvement. The central question of post conflict societies, however, remains political:
how to best construct a stable form of democratic institution complete with the ideal
power sharing and governance21 • There is no unanimous support for any particular
ideology, though democracy has the strongest force of the whole world behind it.
Economically successful nations and international instruments speak in unison highly of
democracy. This favorable image is further demonstrated by public opinion allover the
world. But the next question is whether democracy, with its proper foundation, is in
reality the most viable option for governing a conflict stricken society. It is not clear how
far the TA should have the authority to prescribe any given blend of democracy for the
regime? Especially in the case of Iraq, despite its autocratic system, where the conflict
was not brought about by the ruling party itself, it is not at all convincing that an interim
authority should be empowered to make fundamental changes in the political structure of
a country. Again, the fear of destabilization by democracy itself can not be ignored.
History suggests from the experiences of Burundi, former Yugoslavia and Germany that
elites may rally ethnic sentiment or use ethnic violence to retain power when threatened

21

Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Post conflict Societies, 95 Am. J. Int'1.

L. 86 (2001).
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by democratic changes 22 . Considering the possibilities, it is the purpose of this study to
endeavor to identify and suggest the path for the Transitional Authority has followed in
this respect.
Addressing the root causes of conflict within the society and attending to HR
violations rank among the more important tasks of the interim Government. To add to the
criminal prosecutions of the responsible offenders, the UN introduced Truth
Commissions to accelerate the healing process of a troubled nation. As the case of Iraq is
fundamentally different from any other situation of this kind, it is questionable whether
the judicial process be any different or should not. A question is raised whether an
international tribunal would not be more suitable for a country's ruler where the
neutrality of the trying court is in doubt. History of international law and practice does
not appear to support any such prosecution of a head of State merely with respect to
crimes committed within its territorial constraint. It might have been wiser to have this
prosecution delayed until a regular government is restored in Iraq.
Perhaps the most complex and laborious agenda on T A's hand is one of social
reform. Since every situation has its unique history and consequences, the code of
conduct must be crafted creatively. The local capacities for change and international
commitment to assist the process must be determined first. Religious, ethnic and minority
issues are very sensitive; they should as such be handled with much care and
sophistication. Above all, strategies should be designed to address the case in hand.
Bearing the rare stigma of secularism in the Middle East, it is difficult to imagine how
Iraq would survive the struggle for religious supremacy

22

III

the absence of a secular

Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and the Danger a/War, lnt'! Security, Summer
1995 at 5.
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identity. Did the TA bow to popular demand rather than implementing international
standard is another issue at hand?
It is high time to evaluate the gender issue in peace-keeping force according to the

explanation of the Economic and Social Council- "Women's equal participation in all
aspects of peace processes and attention to gender issues in such processes have been an
important focus of international action, especially since the Fourth World Conference orr
Women and the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action (1995)".23 Gender issues in
post conflict territories cover two aspects- women's equal participation in peace building
and ensuring gender equality in all segments of society. Complaints of violence against
women by the peacekeeping troops must be heard and treated with seriousness. Prison
abuses by the occupying forces in Iraq, for example, must be examined under the
provisions of international instruments. Encountering the gender issue in particular is yet
another challenge for the T A. It is important to find out whether the previous T As has
strictly followed the international guidelines for empowering women. In particular an
examination will be made regarding East Timor as well as Afghanistan, whether the T A
has launched legislate rules to secure women's participation and equal status in all walks
of the society and ultimately by way of comparison the TA in Iraq is coping with the
'woman question' in a structure where democracy might empower the conservative
Muslims over secular forces. In short, it is the object of the present study to ascertain the
best conditions possible for women under international law in these circumstances.

23

ECOSOC 2003.
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To sum up, this work is intended to accomplish a number of objectives, including, among
others1. An analyses, syntheses and examination

In

depth of all the international

instruments relating the to formation of a Transitional Authority, the extent of its
authority and the ecologies of effective authority.
2. A Description of the foundation, legality and procedures undertaken by the Iraqi
Transitional Authority; provision of a critical analysis of the same.
3. A Suggestion of ways and means of implementation, compliance and enforcement
of existing international norms related to Transitional Authorities and recommend
modes of developing the jurisprudence in this area of law.

As the study demands, this dissertation builds on international legislations, mostly
resolutions, treaties, judicial decisions, commentaries, interviews with scholars in
different fields as well as domestic legislations on the subject of T A. The W orId Wide
Web has been especially helpful in the research. This work will be divided into sIX
chapters.
After setting this agenda in Chapter one, Chapter two will discuss the formation
of the TA for Iraq and the Legal consequences arising therefore. I will discuss the
dilemma of unauthorized use of force in this case, international condemnation and
realization of the necessity of international commitment to rebuild this territory. The
political concern regarding the T A being set up by the Coalition Provisional Authority
rather than the United Nations is another point of consideration in this chapter. As I look
into the scope of authority of the CPA, Governing Council, Interim Administration and

14

Transitional Government- together forming the Transitional Authority in Iraq, I answer
four specific questions. First, did the coalition have legal authority to go into Iraq and
overthrow the government, which required installing of a transitional administration?
Second, did the occupying force have legal authority for the character and governance
functions it had assumed? Third, Did the Transitional authority govern within its scope
and limits allowed by international law? Fourth, what effect if any does this temporary
government have over the principle of sovereignty under international law .
In Chapter three, the research will focus on one of the most critical issues for the

TA; drafting a permanent constitution. I will analyze, document and examine the issues
relating to the constitution making process and the content of this constitution. I will
argue in this part that the constitution making process did not satisfy international
standards and a practical approach where the content neglected to identify common
strategies to unify a diverse community.
In Chapter four I will talk about the gender role in rebuilding a society through

TA. The main points for discussion in this chapter are Iraqi legal infrastructure affecting
women, gender sensitivity in the society and participation of women in political as well
as social decision-making. I draw a comparative picture of the situation of women both
under the previous regime and under the T A. Supporting my argument I demonstrate that
women's status during the T A and present government influenced by the constitution
drafted by the T A suffered a major setback compared to the previous autocratic
government. Chapter five deals with another important aspect of post conflict nation buildingestablishing rule of law. Describing international trends for post conflict justice, I analyze

15

two aspects of Iraqi T A efforts- establishing Special Tribunal for trying previous
government's violation of human rights and reconstructing the Iraqi legal system. In this
chapter I argue that though milestones regarding criminal liability of heads of state have
been reached, the special tribunal as well as the reconstruction effort falls short of
international legal standards.
Chapter six is a compilation of all my arguments, development of jurisprudence in
this area of law and recommendation to further enhance the international commitment in
this regard. I will argue that this is high time to enact a complete set of rules with regard
to Transitional Authority and set the limit to the virtually unrestricted broad exercise of
authority. Consequences of violations of the law will be suggested. Even though
international cooperation is needed to rebuild Iraq, the unauthorized act of the use of
force must bear adequate condemnation and the T A should always confirm to
international (In other words UN) standards in all actions and at all times.

16

Chapter II
Transitional Authority in Iraq: Legitimacy and Governance
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Introduction:
"1 will give you a talisman. Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self becomes too
much with you, apply the following test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest
man [woman] whom you may have seen, and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is
going to be of any use to him [her]. Will he [she] gain anything by it? Will it restore him
[her] to a control over his [her] own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to
swara]

[freedom]

for

the

hungry

and

spiritually

starving

millions?

Then you will find your doubts and your self melt away. ,,24
[M K Gandhi, 1948]

In a world that Gandhi, one of the greatest leaders of twentieth century envisioned

freedom benefits the marginalized group of the society; in today's reality, however, it
seems to be about political choices, free market economy and agendas of business
entities. 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' was such an undertaking where an internationally
mandated occupying force assumed the role of Transitional Authority (T A) in Iraq and
offered massive economic and structural reconstruction without much regard to the
common people's interest in basic needs.
The T A in Iraq was installed after the Government of Iraq was ousted in a
preemptive self defense by a coalition force led by the United States. The coalition was
publicized to consist of 49 countries including UK, Japan, Italy, Spain, Turkey,
Philippines and Poland. Whereas the majority of the troops were from the US, many
countries sent token appearances, medical teams and personnel in other capacities instead
of soldiers. Even they were reportedly 'often sent (them) in response to US arm-twisting,

;----------------Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. II (1958) p 65 retrieved from www.mkgandhi.orglgquots on April 6, 2007
18

to carry favor with the world's only superpower or to gain access to Iraqi

Oil,25.

As if to

prove the fragility of the coalition, within a year many countries began to pull out
whatever personnel they provided26 . Heated debates on the legality of the use of force
still exist among international law practitioners 27 • Though the question of legality found
no satisfactory closure from the international legal scholars, the coalition became de facto
sovereign of Iraq and with UN mandate began to exercise authority as occupying force.
Before returning sovereignty to a democratically elected government, the occupying
power Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), Interim
Government (IG) and Transitional Administration (TAd) governed Iraq in the capacity of
temporary government. These four institutions governed Iraq from May 2003 to 2006 and
form the Transitional Authority of Iraq. In my endeavor to analyze governance of Iraq
during this period, I look for the answers to the following questions raised by the
developments of events:
First, did the coalition have legal authority to go into Iraq and overthrow the
government, which required installing of a transitional administration?

25 Global Policy Forum, Iraq Program, retrieved from
~ttp://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/irgindx.htm
(Last visited on April 8, 2007)
.
6
Countrles including Japan, Italy, Spain, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Poland, Costa Rica, Philippines,
~onduras, Dominican Republic have pulled their personnel out of Iraq.
For a complete discussion of the Use of Force in Iraq see Mahmoud Hamoud, The Use of Force against
Ira~: Occupation and Security Council Resolution 148336 Cornell InCl. L. J (435-454) 2003-2004;
Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Preemptive Use offorce: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and
Iraq 4 San Diego InCl L. J. (7-38)2003; Patrick McLain, Settling the score with Saddam: Resolution 1441
~nd Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force against Iraq 13 Duke J. Compo & InCl L. (233-292) 2003;
e~ Saul, The Legality of the Use of Force against Iraq in 2003: Did the coalition defend or defy ihe~~lted Nations? 8 UCLA J. InCl. L. &Foreign Affairs (267-330) 2003; Nikolaos Tsagourias, The
Dlcaragua Case and the Use of Force: The Theoretical Construction of the Decision and its
B~o~struction 1 J. Armed Conflict L. (81-1 ~ 1~ 1996; John C. Yoo &
Tra~hman, ~ess than
394gained for: The Use of Force and the DeclImng Relevance of the Umted NatIOns 5 ChI. J. InCl. L. (379.. Pro).2??4- 2005 ; Edward McWhinney, The USlBritish Invasion of Iraq and the United Nations Charter
. 200~bltIon of the Use of Force: The Paradox of Unintended Consequences 2 Chinese J. InCl. L. (571-586)

':"ill
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Second, did the occupying force have legal authority for the character and
governance functions it had assumed?
Third, did the Transitional authority govern within its scope and limits allowed by
international law?
Fourth, how did the transitional authority affect the existing sovereignty
principle?

Iraq: Cradle of Civilizations
"It's the place where we get the first cities, the first writing, the first thoughts
about what's man's relationship to God. It's the first sort of ideas about death. It's the
first recorded literature that we have ".28

Today's Iraq does not represent that place anymore. Now it's a land of death
waiting at different corners in the guise of suicide bombers. It is hard to believe that the
land where the earliest code Hammurabi 29 emerged has now become one of the most
lawless countries on earth. Known, as the cradle of several civilizations Iraq's history is
one of dominating rulers and repressed peoples 30 . Before becoming the part of the
Turkish Ottoman Empire in 1i

h

Century, Iraq was governed by Sumerians, Babylonians,

Chaldeans, and Persian and Arab rulers. After the First World War Iraq became a British
mandate under the League of Nations and in 1932 became independent. Independent Iraq

28

McGuire Gibson, Professor of Mesopotamian Archeology at the University of Chicago commented on
Morning Edition of National Public Radio, Feb 20 2003. Retrieved from

~:I/www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld-978050

II The Code of Hammurabi is one of the earliest codified laws in the world. It was created in 1760 by King
30 ammurabi of Babylon. For complete text of the code see http://www.wsu.edu/-dee/MESO/CODE.HTM
For complete History of Iraq see George Roux, Ancient Iraq 1992.
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suffered under British mandated monarchy only to be overthrown by military in 1958.
This regime change was followed by two other Baathist coups in 1963 and the 1968.
After the last Saddam Hussein became the vice president of Iraq before taking over as the
President of the Republic in 1979. Saddam Hussein's government was severely criticized
by the UN and the international community for its mistreatment of citizens, brutal
measures against political dissidents, eight year long armed conflict with Iran in the 80's
and invasion of Kuwait in 1990 that sparked the first Gulf war through a Security Council
resolution. Prior to the invasion Iraq, its citizens were sentenced to penury and suffered
from lack of a vibrant civil society culture for the government's political repression.

Legality of the Iraq war

Historically, a state was free to treat its citizens, as it wished based on the
principle of sovereignty.31 If we leave out the religious and national solidarity factor
encouraging interventions, the first legal doctrine developed during the Grotius era32 . In
1625 he wrote:

", whether a war for the subjects of another be just, for the purpose of defending
them from injuries by their rulers. Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil societies
were formed, the ruler of each claimed some especial right over his own subjects .... (But)

.
L OUIS Henkin, 'The Internationalization of Human rights' (1977) 6 Proceedings of the General
EdUcation Seminar 7, quoted in Louis Henkin et al (eds), International Law: Cases and Materials
(1987)981
32
. For general discussion see Andrew Field, The legality of Humanitarian Intervention and the Use of Force
In the Absence of United Nations Authority, Monash University Law Review (Vol 26 no2 '00)

31

21

if a tyrant....practices atrocities towards his subjects,

which no just man can approve, the

right of social human connection is not cut off in such case. ,,33

The Grotius doctrine of 'Social human connection' was followed in many·
interventions since then 34 but mostly remained as an exception to the rule of non
intervention. Situations were overlooked when there existed no Real Politik benefit but
never on the ground of non-interventional theory. As Field points out, it was only after
the UN Charter was drafted that 'a split in this near unanimity as to when humanitarian
intervention was legitimate' arose in the legal scholarship. The debate is surrounded
around Article 2(4) of the Charter that states,
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of any force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations. 35

This article is considered to be a jus cog ens principle or peremptory norm
meaning that states are obliged not to depart from this rule. The first paragraph
emphasizes an outright ban on the use of force. The second paragraph provides the
exceptions to this rule. Use of force is legitimate in case of self defense
37

deployments of force authorized by Chapter vii of the charter

•

36

and collective

Since no other exception

is made, it can be concluded that unilateral or collective use of force or humanitarian
intervention without UN approval has been declared illegal in the Charter.
Support for this position is apparent in the Corfu Channel case where the
International court of Justice (ICJ) mentions intervention as capable of leading to
33
34 Hugo

Grotius, 2 De Jure Belli est Pacis, ch xxv, 438 (1625, Whewell trans. 1853) quoted in Field 342
David
Scheffer
35
Charter ofthe United Nations (1945) reproduced in Louis Henkin et al (eds) Basic Documents to
nd
~~pplement International Law: Cases and Materials (2 edition, 1987) 99
37 Article 51 of the UN Charter
Article 42 of the UN Charter
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'perverting the administration of international justice itself 38. The IC] reiterated the
doctrine once again in the case of Military and Paramilitary activities in and against

Nicaragua in 1986. It further declared that Article 2(4) of the Charter became customary
international law , a binding obligation for the states.
Whatever the position of international law may have been, invasion, intervention
and the most recent use of force phenomenon have kept the horrors of war alive in
today's world. The post cold war era has produced a number of legal armed interventions
many of which have been subject to criticisms by legal scholars. As pointed out by Anne
Orford, the supporters of such trend dominate the scholarships today:

'One of the most significant changes in international politics to emerge during that
period was the growth of support, within mainstream international law and international
relations circles, for the idea that force can be legitimately used as a response to
humanitarian challenges .... ,39
After the end of US-Russia enmity in the SC, the power to authorize use of force
has proliferated unrestrictedly. Threat to peace has received very broad interpretations
even to include popular leaders restricting market economy or WTO influence in their
territories 4o . Many scholars are looking at this development as human rights movements
going on to the offensive. Realists defend this development on the ground that states'
practice in this area is practically customary intemationallaw. In many cases action or
silence by the international community is driven by political motivations. Even where the

UN did not approve that attack, states have supported interventions directly or in silence
38
39

Corfu Channel case of the IC}, 1946
Anne Orford, Reading humanitarian intervention: human rights and the use offorce in intemationallaw,
~2 Cambridge University Press, 2003
For example, Cuba and Venezuela are being considered as threats to regional stability by the USA
because of their preferences for state owned enterprises.
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where it affected their interest. The Indian intervention in East Pakistan that led to the
independence of Bangladesh in 1971 from Pakistan is one of such cases. Despite UN
condemning the actions as 'violation of Pakistan's territorial sovereignty', India got
involved apparently overwhelmed by the refugee crises. In a contrasting situation
province of Biafra in Nigeria did not receive any significant recognition or aid from the
international community in its secessionist effort the same time. Supporting the NATO
intervention in former Yugoslavia, which was not authorized by the SC, Field concluded
that doctrine of humanitarian intervention must continue to exist41
In this backdrop of debate regarding use of force and its validity under
international law, the United Sates together with coalition forces led an attack against
Iraq in April 2003. The coalition primarily defended its action by relying on the
interpretations of the SC resolutions 678, 687 and 144142. These resolutions were adopted
under the authority of chapter vii and were interpreted by the coalition force to have
allowed them to invade Iraq. Supporters of the administration rallied behind the theories

Field, ibid 361
42 Resolution 678: Adopted in 29 November 1990, this resolution authorized the use offorce in
Iraq to eject it from Kuwait and to restore peace and security in that area. It also authorized use of all
'necessary means' for all relevant resolutions. The broad measure of all necessary means included military
action.
Resolution 687: Adopted in 3 April 1991, this resolution provided the conditions for cease fire
and imposed continuing obligation on Iraq to eliminate its WMD in order to restore international peace and
security. It further empowered the SC to take steps to implement the resolution and to secure peace and
security in that region.
Resolution 1441: This resolution was adopted in 8 November 2002 and gave Iraq the final
~~portunity to comply with its obligation to disarm. It also warned Iraq of serious consequences in case of
dailure to comply but did not specify any penalty or punishment. As no specific course of action was
;scribed, this should not have been read as an authorization of using force against Iraq. Also the effort by
theys and UK governments in seeking a resolution specifically authorizing an attack against Iraq speak of
elf understanding of the limitation of SC 1441. Similar view can be found

41
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of supremacy of Security Council resolutions even when specific non-authorization
.

43

eXIsts .
The Australian and UK governments relied on the interpretations of SC resolution 678 to
justify the attack.
The US government went a step further and built its case on the principle of selfdefense. After voting on SC resolution 1441, US Ambassador to the UN John
Negroponte made his point clear by claiming ' ... this resolution does not constrain any
member state from acting to defend itself against threat posed by Iraq .. ,44

.

There has been no general acceptance of the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense
within the structure of the UN beyond a possible right of interceptive self-defense.
Interceptive self defense confers a right on states to defend themselves against actions of
another state, of sufficient magnitude which clearly have a hostile intent, before the
aggressor's forces actually execute the attack. 45 The mostly noted pre-emptive attack
under Article 51 was the Israeli air strike on a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 that was
criticized by the UNSC as a clear violation of internationallaw.

46

The mere fact that both arguments for and against the Iraq war involved legality
under international law has been praised by many. Professor Ibrahim 1. Gassama quoted
wrote,

43

For example consider Hoover Fellow and Professor of Law at the Stanford University, Abraham D.
Sofaer's argument" It is unreasonable to refuse to give weight to Security Council actions in evaluating the
need (and hence the legality) for using force merely because the Security Council may not have granted
~xplicit authority" in On the Legality of Preemption, Hoover Digest 2003 No 2 p 68.
45 wWw.pbs.org!newshourlbblinternational/july-dec02/iraq_setup_11-08.html - 23k rd
Y Dinstein, War, Aggression & Self Defense (Cambridge, University Press 3 edition 2001) 172-173
~uoted in Peters n 12 p 10.
For a general discussion on this see ibid
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"One must pause and reflect on the fact that at least for a short period and at a
certain level of discourse, the notion of international legality attained a status few were
willing to challenge openly- certainly not on the rhetorical plane. 47 "

Though the UN Secretary General in his personal capacity has called the invasion
illegal, the official stand of the world organization is still not clear. Scholars continue to
argue both sides only to prove the weakness of international legal regime in this regard.
The UN SC resolution 1483 virtually drove the issue in a different wave while
recognizing the coalition force as occupying authority thus binding them under the laws
of war.

Authority of UN in delegating power to occupiers
When the UN undertakes to administer temporary administration of any country
or territory, it seems easier to justify the legitimacy of its actions under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. The authority of the Security Council under Article 39 justifies any action
by the body in responding to "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the

peace, or act of aggression"

48.

As the language permits broad interpretation, internal

conflict, breakdown of security structure as well as governance complications can be
described to amount to threat to peace and security. The Council has previously used the
49

measures to address humanitarian disasters, refugee crises and the like

.

The same

argument could be used to evaluate the authority of the coalition forces as occupying

47

Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The invasion of Iraq in Context 18 Emory

!tl. L. Rev. 7 2004
49

Article 39 of the Charter
Article 39 has been invoked to address the situations in Haiti, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda etc.
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powers. Whether 'occupation' itself is a violation of international law remains to be
explored, UN's delegating the governance function to an occupying power must be
recognized as valid under chapter VII of the Charter.
Question may arise as to whether introducing a temporary government structure is
within the authority of Article 38. Though measures like imposition of embargo,
interruption of communication or severing diplomatic relations have been identified as
valid actions by the SC in addition to use of force, these are by no means exhaustive and
may include temporary governance solutions so . The introduction of international criminal
tribunals for former Yugoslavia and RwandaSl through the Council supports the view that
going beyond the expressed provisions of the Charter is well within the authority of Sc.
As long as a threat to peace is determined, any measure by the SC seems to be under the
purview of the Charter. Accordingly, creating an institution for governance and
delegating the authority to an occupying force do not pose any legal concerns.
Another pressing argument concerning the legitimacy of such a temporary
government authorized by the SC is that it contradicts the principle of state sovereignty.
"Based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members"s2 the UN Charter
mandates that members settle their international disputes by peaceful manners and refrain
" in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state"S3. The notion of occupation is directly
conflicting with the utterances of the Charter until the provision of enforcement under SC

Art·IC1e 41 of UN Charter
~l SfRes/827 (1993) established that International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia
2 Article 2( 1) of the Charter
S3 Art· 1
IC e 2(4) ofthe Charter
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authority comes into effect54 . This principle of subjecting state sovereignty to the
judgments of a few powerful states, namely the SC permanent members is a controversial
but influential one. Once in effect, it legitimizes all actions taken by the SC including
building temporary governance institutions. Since members of the UN submit to the
authority of UN Charter, they also agree to this SC superiority over their sovereign
powers. This consented demotion of sovereignty may raise philosophical concerns but is
perfectly within the realm of international law.

The Occupying power and Their Legal Authority
It is an interesting phenomenon of international law that law of occupation deals

exclusively with the consequences of an occupation after it has taken place
notwithstanding the reasons or justification of the occupation. Likewise, the Iraq war or
invasion without the Security Council resolution may have been illegal, but as soon as the
coalition forces satisfied the requirements of becoming occupying force, the yardstick for
their performance was obligations of occupying forces under intemationallaw. In order
to determine the scope of authority of the CPA and its implementation, it is essential to
look at the law of occupation.
According to Article 42 of 1907 Hague Convention N respecting the laws and
customs of war on land,

Art.
Icle 2(7) of the Charter, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll"
54
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"Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority
of the hostile army'65.
Shortly after the US led coalition entered Iraq, there was little doubt about the
failure of Saddam Hussein's government to exercise effective authority over Iraq's
affairs. Legitimacy of the occupation came through SC Res. 1483 that established the US
and UK forces as occupying power and recognized their authorities, responsibilities and
obligations under applicable internationallaw

56

International humanitarian law clearly communicates the authorities and
responsibilities of the occupying power embedded in Article 42-56 of the Hague
Convention s7 • Whether the occupying power has successfully met its obligations is a
question of fact and requires careful examination of the events that followed the
occupation.
The first and perhaps the foremost obligation of an occupying power

IS

'to

restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country ,58. The Hague Convention
continues with duties of the occupying power to refrain from forcing the inhabitants to
59
furnish information relating to the belligerent or of the belligerent defense , compelling
62
the inhabitants to swear allegiance to it60 , confiscating private property61, 100ting etc.

Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907 retrieved from
56
.
SIResl1483 (2003) retrIeved from
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOCIGENIN03/368/53"IPDFIN0336853 .pdf?OpenElement on March 21,
2007
.
57
Id
58 Art.
59
Icle 43 of the Hague Convention IV of 1907
Article 44
60 Article 45
61 Art.
Icle 46
62 Art.
Icle 47
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Duties binding the US led coalition as occupying powers are also found in the
Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of war.
Part ill of the Convention puts forth the obligations of occupiers towards the people
within the territory and management of different resources of the territory (Part III). Few
provisions of the additional protocol of the Convention (I of 1977) also apply to the
occupiers.
SC Res. 1483 and SC Res. 1511 removed whatever limitations the codified law
may have presented and allowed the authority broader range of powers including
administration of justice and post conflict reconstruction measures.
Question arose whether the provisions of human rights instruments like ICCPR
and ECHR should have been applied to the Iraqi people. The ICJ commented on the
Advisory opinion on Nuclear weapons,
"The protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does
not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby
certain provisions may be derogatedfrom in a time of national emergency,,63
Though signatories of the treaties both UK and US maintained otherwise.

64

The

occupying power thus derogated from a well-established principle of international law.

63
64 Para

25, Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, ICJ website
The US contended that ICCPR does not apply during armed conflicts and outside the territory of the
United States; The UK maintained that ECHR only applies to contracting parties and within the borders of
a signatory. For more on this see Ralph Wilde, The applicability of International Human Rights Law to the
Coalition Provisional Authority(CPA) and Foreign Military Presence in Iraq 11 ILSA 1.In1'l & Compo L.
(485-495) 2004-2005
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Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Occupying liberators
Led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, the CPA was created replacing the
ORHA and its primary responsibility of reconstruction of Iraq. "The lack of an
authoritative and unambiguous statement about how this organization was established"
65 gave way to two competing theories about its creation. On one hand it may have been
an act by the US President materializing by a National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD), on the other SC Res. 1483 have been mentioned as the primary source for its
creation. The official version of the CPA documents also leave this question unanswered
and rather discusses deriving of its authority from the SC Res. 1483, the laws of war and
from the institution of CPA itself6.
The mandate was to exercise powers of government temporarily during the
transitional period that included restoring conditions of stability and security, creating
conditions for the Iraqi people to be able to determine their political future through
restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative
government and facilitation of economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and
development67 . All the laws previously in force in Iraq were declared valid as long as
they were consistent with the CPA objectives and did not become obsolete because of
any action by the CPA or Iraqi government

68

.

L. Elaine Halchin, The coalition Provisional Authority: Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional
authorities, CRS Report for Congress April 29, 2004 retrieved from
~tP:llwww.fas.org/man/crsIRL32370.pdf on March 27, 2007
. CPAlREGI16 May 2003/01 retrieved from Official website of the CPA http://www.cpa~.org/regulations/#Regulations on March 27, 2007
68 CPNREGI16 May 2003/01 Section 1 Para 1
CPA Reg. 1 Section 2
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In its promulgated 12 regulations69 , 100 orders, 17 memoranda and 13 public

notices, the CPA exercised its authority as vested through the SC sometimes going
outside the sphere of its mandate.
Though the authority and objectives of the CPA had been explained in precise
terms, the background of its establishment remained in the dark. The communication
from the US administration had been one of eliminating options rather than offering one.
Halchin correctly observed,
Available infonnation about the authority found in materials produced by the
Administration alternatively: (1) deny that it is a federal agency; (2) state that it is a U.S.
government entity; (3) suggest that it was enacted under United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1483; (4) refer to it, and OHRA, as "civilian groups .... reporting to
the Secretary [of Defense 1,,70
The true identity of such an institution may seem less important than its mission
under the circumstances, but its long running effect is undeniable. Lack of founding
institution may have allowed the CPA officials, more specifically the Administrator
evade accountability and face possible consequences for the mismanagement of issues 71.

69 The official CPA website defines 'Regulations' as instruments that define the institutions and authorities
of the CPA; 'Orders' as binding instructions or directives to the Iraqi people that create penal consequences
or have a direct bearing on the way Iraqis are regulated, including changes touaqi law; 'Memoranda' as
expand on Orders or Regulations by creating or adjusting procedures applicable to an Order or Regulation;
'Public Notices' as the intentions of the Administrator to the public and may require adherence to security
measures that have no penal consequence or reinforces aspects of existing law that the CPA intends to
enforce•
70
71 Halchin, CRS Report, p 38
The CPA was accountable to the Department of Defense of the United States. The UN or the Iraqi people
had no authority over the institution thus no way of evaluating its performance.
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Governing Council of Iraq: Shadowy existence
On July 13 of 2003, the CPA formed a 25 member interim body called Governing
Council of Iraq. This diverse Council consisted of 13 Shia Muslims, 5 Sunni Muslims, 5
Kurds, 1 Christian and 1 Turkrnen. CPA formally recognized the Council as 'the

principal body of the Iraqi interim administration, pending the establishment ·of an
internationally recognized, representative government by the people of /raq,72.
According to the CPA, its main responsibility was to uphold Iraqi people's interest in the
interim administration and 'in determining the means of establishing an internationally

recognized, representative government' 73. The Council was to provide advice and
leadership to the CPA until the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim government.
Though the Council's power was subject to the authority of the CPA administrator, few
controversial decisions by the body had not been officially endorsed by the CPA. For
example, Iraq's secular family law was about to be replaced by Islamic law giving rise to
concerns that it would undermine women's rights and privileges traditionally enjoyed in
Iraqi society74. This Council also declared the day Baghdad fell as a national holiday and
banned television stations that did not support the coalition agendas.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the Governing Council was the
preparation of the temporary constitution 'Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)' to
determine the governance structure of the interim administration, timeline for a National
Assembly election, drafting of a permanent constitution and elections to a permanent

CPAlREG/13 July 2003106
C~AlREG/13 July 2003/06
DIrective 137 of December 29, 2003 passed by the Governing Council of Iraq

33

government. A closer look at the drafting and content of this document is warranted for
evaluating the Council's role in rebuilding Iraq.
The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, also
known as the TAL became effective on June 30, 2004 after the CPA formally transferred
sovereignty to the interim administration. The TAL declared Iraq as republic, federal,
democratic and pluralistic75 where the 'federal system shall be based upon geographic
and historical realities and separation of powers and not upon origin, race, ethnicity,
nationality, or confession,.76 Islam was proclaimed the official religion of Iraq77 , a

feature all too familiar with the regions' countries to which secular Iraq had been a
progressive exception. The emphasis on religion grew stronger as it was mentioned as a
source of legislation. Later on an identical provision is found in the permanent
Constitution of Iraq.
In its 62 Articles within 9 chapters, the TAL promises many reforms including

'the basic rights of all Iraqis, including freedom of religion and worship, the right to free
expression, to assemble peacefully, to vote, to a fair trial, and to be treated equally under
the law,78; independence of the judiciary and separation of powers; balanced executive

powers by the President and the Prime Minister and federalism. Many of the provisions
have come under vigorous criticism from legal scholars. Whereas the fundamental right
regime is more progressive than most other constitutions in the world including the USA,
many others fail to meet practical considerations. The chapter five clauses that requires
two-third majority among National Assembly members to agree on the identity of the

75
76

Arti

cle 4 of TAL
4 of TAL
78 Article 7(A) of TAL
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/democracyITAL-themes.html

17 Article
.
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presidency council consisting of a president and two vice-presidents has attracted a lot of
negative comments from scholars 79 . Calling it a 'neo-colonial imposition' and
' .. Characteristic of only one nation on Earth, i.e. American Iraq' professor Juan Cole
observed

HI fear it is functioning in an anti-democratic manner to thwart the will of the
majority of Iraqis, who braved great danger to come out and vote ,,80
Minority groups seem to have considerable rights in the TAL. The National
Assembly needs a three fourth majority to pass a measure if vetoed by the presidency
council after passing by a simple majority. The 'three fourth majority' rule also applies in
amending the TAL. Though this emphasis on the minority consensus in national issues
has met with criticisms, there is true potential for building a just society by implementing
this provision. Majority preferred democracies led to much violent oppression of
marginal communities throughout history81 and securing legislative measures only by
confirming minority approval can translate into a protection of minority rights in Iraq.
This can also create check and balance situation in the National Assembly to diffuse the
interests of conservative religious groups in legislating laws denying rights to women in
the name of religion. Unfortunately, rather than uniting different groups, the TAL and

Article 36 (A) of TAL provides, "The National Assembly shall elect a President of the State and two
Deputies. They shall form the Presidency Council, the function of which will be to represent the
sovereignty oflraq and oversee the higher affairs of the country. The election of the Presidency Council
shall take place on the basis of a single list and by a two-thirds majority of the members' votes. The
~ational Assembly has the power to remove any member of the Presidency Council of the State for
Incompetence or lack of integrity by a three-fourths majority of its members' votes. In the event of a
vacancy in the Presidency Council, the National Assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of its members,
~~ect a replacement to fill the vacancy."
Juan Cole is professor of modern Middle Eastern and South Asian history at the University of Michigan
and hosts a reputed web diary on events in Iraq. He is quoted from a BBC online feature retrieved from
~ews.bbc.co.uk/2/hiJmiddle eastl4359559.stm on March 30, 2007.
Consider the ethnic violence in Yugoslavia, Rwanda in the 90's.
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subsequent permanent constitution of Iraq has successfully divided ethnicities and tum
the country into a violent society.

Iraqi Interim Government: Conditional sovereignty
The Iraqi interim government was described as the first initiative of the occupying
power to return sovereignty of Iraq to Iraqi people. Facilitated by Lakhdar Brahimi,
Special Advisor on Iraq to the Secretary General of the UN and in consultation with the
CPA and the Governing council, 'The Iraqi Interim Government was formed through a

process of wide-ranging consultation with Iraqis, including political leaders, religious
and tribal leaders and civic associations,82. Operating under the TAL this government
consisted of a President, two Deputy Presidents, a Prime Minister leading a Council of
Ministers, an interim national council composed of diverse groups of Iraqis and a Judicial
authority. The primary responsibility of the interim government was to prepare for the
national election to be held through which a representative Iraqi Transitional Government
would come into being and lead the country towards a permanent constitution and
democratic leadership. Begin functioning on June 30 of 2004, the interim body had only
till January 1, 2005 to prepare for the national election. Tasks like administering day to
day affairs of Iraq, providing welfare and security for the people and promoting economic
development were also in the agenda of this body.
Though this government was recognized by the UN and few other countries as
sovereign power of Iraq, the occupying forces specially the US exercised actual control
Over the territory. The CPA was officially dissolved but by installing a group of Iraqis
82

•

. IraqI Interim Government, Announcement ceremony Press packet, retrieved from http://www.cpai~I&!J~!W:nm~'Q@~Pill'~llili on March 31, 2007
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loyal to the occupation agendas, they managed to dictate the events from under a veil.
The 31 member body was crowded with exile Iraqis and US favorites. The most powerful
position in Iraq for this interim period went to Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who had been
reported to be closely related to the CIA and US administration during exile years 83 .
Even though the appointments were officially made by the UN representative, the fact of
Mr. Brahimi's resignation only after two weeks speaks volumes about his approval of the
84

process .
Many controversial actions of the interim government have been linked to the
Prime Minister including reintroducing capital punishment for criminal offences 85 ,
fonnation of a secret spy agency to tackle insurgency, and banning news channel Al
Jazeera for thirty days. Allawi has been reported to have executed suspected insurgents
himself in the presence of at least a dozen Iraqi and American security personnel. To
appoint Allawi in the significant position can be viewed as an assurance of de facto CPA
rule in Iraq.
The Interim government was vested with powers 'to conclude international

agreements in the areas of diplomatic relations and economic reconstruction, including
Iraq's sovereign debt' without being able to 'amend the TAL or to form agreements
which permanently alter the destiny of Iraq' 86. Ironically drafted by chosen Iraqis of the
CPA, some of the provisions of the TAL have changed Iraq and its secular heritage
.
V anous articles published in New York Times, Washington Post and other reputed media outlets
~~ggested such connections .
. In an June 22, 2004 Asian times Article, Kilveh Afrasiabi wrote, "the mere fact that Lakhdar Brahimi, the
. UN's special envoy on Iraq, has reportedly tendered his resignation out of frustration with the Bush
a~mi~istration, which undercut his efforts to install an interim government in Iraq after misleading him into
thinking that this would be essentially his call, represents another sobering lesson of "roads not taken" by
World organization vis-a-vis a major international crisis" retrieved from
83

,~~~~Qill~illTh~~~~WL~illktb~~nm~onMay7,2007

abolished the death penalty for any criminal offence in Iraq.
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profoundly and the so-called sovereign government was openly forbidden to change any
of those. During the Governing Council and mterim Government, fundamental changes
made to Iraqi economic structure also raises question of sovereignty and whether these
Transitional Administrations complied with their authorities prescribed by international
law.
Before handing over sovereignty to the interim administration, Paul Bremer
promised to withdraw coalition troops upon request from the government. As any request
was never made, the troops got comfortable. The trend continues today. Iraq is
unofficially under US military surveillance. There is even talk in the US to send more
troops. Where allies in the coalition including the UK have taken steps to remove their
presence from Iraq, US continue to call the shots today. The occupying cap may not be
there any more, but US claims moral authority to advise, criticize even force certain
agendas inside Iraq.

Iraqi Transitional Government
After the election took place for the National Assembly in January 2005 under the
leadership of the Iraqi interim Government, the Iraqi Transitional Government became
the first elected government of Iraq after the occupation in 2003. This body also operated
under the TAL. Besides the traditional governance functions, the Transitional
Government's main responsibilities were to draft a permanent constitution and to form a
permanent democratic government.
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The National Assembly failed to form a representative government as Sunni
Iraqis boycotted the election. The structure of the government remained the same as the
interim government as TAL was the foundation for both. This government's performance
as the drafter of the constitution met with severe criticism. As I take a look at the
constitution building process in chapter two, it becomes clear that the rushed process
presented a constitution with numerous rights without much planning for the
implementation and left a lot of loop holes through which Iraqi society may become
hostage to civil war, theocracy and male domination. After two years, many of those
fears are coming alive.

Multi National Force (MNF)
Referring to the coalition forces as multi national force, the UN welcomed the
'willingness of the multinational force to continue efforts to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in support of the political transition,87. Thus
occupation forces under the CPA became UN mandated security forces under the
sovereign transitional government. They were bound to act 'in accordance with
international law, including obligations under international humanitarian law,88.
During the occupation, these forces have been accused of using incendiary
weapons violating norms of international humanitarian law 89. More than thousand
innocent people have reportedly been killed by the troops during house searches, check
posts, -air raids and in other circumstances. One of the most publicized incidents despite
SCIREG/1546 of 2004
Id
89 Reputed NGOs like Amnesty International and Global Policy Forum among others have accused the
coalition forces of using napalm, white phosphorus, depleted uranium, cluster munitions and other
incendiary weapons on civilian targets.
87

88

39

attempt to cover up took place in Haditha on November 19 2005, in which case the
members of the troops went into a rampage killing 24 innocent Iraqis when one of their
soldiers died in a roadside bomb9o . The insecurity faced by the MNF is sometimes met
with frustration and random shooting of the civilians. The latest incident in March 2005
regarding the killing of an Italian secret service agent by mistake at a US check point in
91

Baghdad attracted much attention and brought this neglected issue for discussion

•

Immunity granted to the coalition force by the CPA that translated into immunity
for the multinational force prevented any of the atrocities to be tried in Iraqi courts. The
troops are under the jurisdiction of their native countries, similar to the UN peace keeping
force regulations. Only a few complaints of violence and atrocities against the US forces
have been investigated resulting in convictions for even fewer soldiers.

Nation Building
"The ultimate goal for Iraq is a durable peace for a unified and stable,
democratic Iraq that is underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing
market economy. A key long-range strategic objective is a secure environment for people
and property that enables citizens to participate fully in political and economic lije,,92.

[Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments]

90

See May 29, 2006 issue of Washington Post ~ http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp. ,~Yn/content/articleI2006/051281AR200605280 1011.html
". US troops killed Nicola Calipari as he was returning with Giuliana Sgrena, a hostage whose release he
'. Just facilitated on March 4 2005. See full coverage on
. 'h~:llwww.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/O" 1431126,OO.html
An Historic Review oj CPA Accomplishments retrieved from http://www.cpa-iraq.org!

40

I

Right before returning sovereignty to elected transitional authorities, the CPA
communicated its strategic 'goals and objectives' in these words. It claimed to have
'achieved its primary goals' before leaving Iraq and helped Iraqis build the fundamental
pillars of sovereigrity- security, essential services, economy and governance.
Nation building by a foreign power may mean exercising the domestic authority
to create an institutional framework to return sovereignty to the people through a political
process. Depending on the existing preconditions of a territory, it may mean fostering a
national identity or nurturing a political culture that represents the interest of its citizens.
Whatever the goal may be the foreign power must respect original sovereignty of the
people and keep in mind the cultural component of their lives. Reforms imposed by
external experts or ideologies notwithstanding the experiences of the native people are
destined to fail 93 • The actions of the CPA, Governing Council, Interim Government and
Transitional Government must be weighed against the requirement of acting within their
authority.
Though SC Res. 1483 recognized the coalition as occupying power allowing them
venture into nation building to some extent, the right came with limited authority. The
occupying forces were only authorized to restore a country's law and order situation
without altering any fundamental feature of it94 . The restriction CPA put on the
Governing Council and the Interim Government through TAL and an obligation not to
amend it were meant for them in terms of drafting the temporary Constitution.

: 93

For example, Ash U Bali mentions Toby Dodge as detailing the ambitious and unsuccessful British effort
to build a liberal Iraq that tried to 'transplant foreign political conceptions and institutions without a
understanding of Iraqi society'. 30 Yale 1. Int'l. L. 2005 (431-466). For a contrasting picture,
. reconstruction of Germany by the US after the WWII.
ArtIcle 43 of 1907 Hague Regulations
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Under the mandate of previous TAs and occupation Law, security is the first and
foremost important issue for the temporary authority. In a report published in October
2004 , the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded in part,

" war in Iraq has probably inflamed radical passion among Muslims, and that's
increased Al Qaeda's recruiting power and morale, and at least marginally its operating
capabl'l'lty ,,95 .
The consequences of the T A's failure to rebuild the security structure have not
only failed to solve the present security concerns but also created a dangerous future for
the whole region. Previously the US has criticized the UN for its lack of planning and
resources of peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world
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Ironically the US

forces in Iraq met with the same reactions from many sources.
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In the form of economic reconstruction, the CPA had introduced major changes in
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the existing Iraqi structure even before the Governing Councilor Interim Government
came into existence. By promulgating orders, the CPA Administrator removed all
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conditions, safeguards even sovereign preferences from the Iraqi economic regime to
allow market economy to flourish. During its 13 month rule in Iraq, the CPA facilitated
the transition of Iraqi economy from a 'non-transparent centrally planned economy to a
market economy characterized by sustainable economic

growth through

the

establishment of a dynamic private sector,97. In the process, many fundamental changes
were brought about in the economic framework 98 :

Cross posted from Democracy Now website @
~ttp://www.democracynow.orglarticle.pl ?sid=03/1 0/16/1534236
6 US State Department's official comment on Brahimi report on UN Peacekeeping reform, retrieved from
p://www.usembassy.itlfile200008/alia/a0082307.htm (page last visited AprilS, 2007).
98 CPNORD/19 September 2003/39
CPA Orders 17,39,49
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•

Privatization of state-owned enterprises

•

National treatment of foreign firms

•

100% foreign ownership permissible in all sectors except oil and mineral
extraction

•

Unrestricted and tax free remittance of all funds related to investment

•

Forty year ownership licenses with an option to renew

•

Reduction of corporate tax to flat rate of 15%

•

Suspension of 25% levy on company profits

•

Immunity of Foreign Liaison Missions, their personnel, property, funds or
assets from Iraqi legal system during the CPA administration.

These orders modifying the fundamental features of Iraqi economic scenario raise some
serious concerns. First of all, the CPA opened all state enterprises for privatization
including utility services. In most countries of the world, particularly in the developing
countries governments are usually held as the guardians of people's welfare and
responsible for offering these basic necessities of everyday lives to everyone including
the ones who are unable to provide for the services99 • The measure basically took away
the hope for the marginalized population of Iraq. Unemployment of government
employees and offering reconstruction contracts to non Iraqi firms contributed largely to
the unemployment problem in the aftermath of the conflict. 100
Measures related to foreign investments are potentially more harmful for the Iraqi

-

economy than the claim of improving it. Allowing 100% foreign ownership in important

99

. my stay in Doha, Qatar from 1988-1990, the utility services of water, electricity, telephone etc
nunng

:re provided free for all citizens and residents in that country. Recently Qatar introduced utility charges.
Supra n Bali p 442
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sectors, unrestricted tax free remittance, 40 year contracts with options for renewal- each
of these rules make it impossible for a war tom country to revive and rebuild its
economy. The national treatment clause meant for foreign investments stand in complete
contrast to the general internationally accepted measure for developing countries where
governments subsidize or otherwise facilitate the blooming of businesses owned by their
citizens. Even the WTO leaves discretionary power to government under special
circumstances to regulate aspects of foreign investment and native businesses. One of the
reasons a multi lateral treaty on foreign investment does not exist today is the deep
division between the interests of the global north and the global south. Developed
countries are interested in unrestricted access and tax free exits with profits whereas the
developing countries insist on accountability and the final word on investment sectors. As
a result bi lateral investment treaties are made worldwide ironically many times to the
detriment of the interest of developing countries. 101 A country like Iraq struggling to
survive literally in every state affair and recovering from decade long economic sanction
and two wars is definitely in no position to negotiate a treaty in equal footing. So, the
impact ofthese rules is 'stark and designed to be durable ,102

•

Ideally all these changes are not permanent as the democratically elected
government can amend these provisions. Practically, however, this proved to be
ineffective. Dependence on international aid mostly backed by the US and the existence
of the US companies and investors through the CPA orders in the beginning of post
conflict period made it even harder for a fragile government to negotiate an exit strategy.

101

See Zakia Afrin, Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development in the Least- Developed
.Countries, Annual Survey of International &Comparative Law, vol. x 2004 for a complete discussion.
102

Supra n Bali p 443
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The long term reform strategy that Iraqi economy needed had been absent during the
transitional period and it became a new challenge for post conflict Iraq.
The discussion about CPA actions that led to this economic malfunction for Iraq
must not deviate attention from the fact that those orders were made without authority, in
violation of international law. The Transitional authorities' actions, besides bringing
concerns over legitimacy contradict with the notion of sovereignty.
The reconstruction of essential services was another major task that the CPA took
over. Lack of adequate preparation had its effect on this. In the words of the CPA
Administrator,
"The reconstruction job proved to be harder than we anticipated because
American prewar planning had not anticipated the enormity and difficulty of the tasks
ahead of us"

..\

.,

103.

According to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the US
House of Congress, $20 billion was disbursed to the CPA during its 14 months stay in
Iraq as Iraq Development Fund (IDF) and others

l04

.

Stressing that the IDF were not

'appropriated American funds' rather' Iraqi Funds' Mr. Bremer answered the allegations
of mismanagement of the money in very simple manner
"It was not a pe rfiect so lutzon.
'
B ut t here were no pelject
.1".
'
. I raq ,,
so lutzons
In

1
05

Involvement of US corporations in the reconstruction effort from the very
beginning of Iraq situation has raised many eyebrows. The CPA, however denied its

103

Oral Remarks by the Honorable Ambassador L Paul Bremer, III before the committee on Government
oversight and Reform, U.S House of Representatives, February 6 2007 ;retrieved from Committee's
official website http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20070206131720-22115.pdf (last visited April 5,
2007)
104
105 Oversight Committee report

Id
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involvement in awarding the contracts and maintained that the Army had been in charge
of reconstructions contracts l06 • This fact, however, complements the growing trend of UN
-World Bank advocacy of engaging private enterprises in war tom societies for bringing
about economic reform. lO? Truly the private sector can attract flow of capital,
employment and necessary services in most cases; at the same time it may also create
indecent disparities of income between different groups and aid government corruption.
The negative effects of ill managed privatization may range from lack of native industries
to a destabilized society on the verge of civil war. Random economic globalization
promoting free market economy had divided functioning societies. In case of Iraq it may
have even contributed to aggravate the sectarian divides.
Disagreement with UN about the Iraq invasion or arrogance of doing it alone,
whatever the reason may have been the UN had a very limited role to play in CPA
dominated sovereign Iraq. In the beginning of recognizing the invasion, the Security
Council envisioned a greater involvement and requested appointment of a special
representative for the country108. The Council also mandated the representative's
Responsibilities to be coordination of the activities of the UN in post conflict processes,
coordination among UN and other international agencies engaged in reconstruction and
humanitarian activities and coordination with the CPA in matters of return of refugees
and displaced persons, restore and establish institutions for representative governance,

106

In the Oral Remark, Mr. Bremer mentioned, "Before I leftfor Iraq, the Pentagon designated the
Department of the Army as the executive agent for the CPA, including "Management oversight for the
acquisition and contracting support". The Army's contracting responsibilities extended to both the Iraqi
{l:JUls and the appropriatedJunds." Oversight Committee Report
For discussion of the joint effort by the UN and World Bank, see Allen Garson, Peace Building: The
vate sectors role in 95 Am. J. Int'! L. 2001 (102-119)
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economic reconstructions etc l09 . A subsequent resolution established the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMl)llO. Unfortunately the good start didn't last long as
UN pulled out of Iraq following the bombing of its compound in Iraq that resulted in
deaths of fifteen UN staff members including the Special Representative Sergio Vieira de
Mello. Just a month back he mentioned the need for UN to communicate their
independent identity and will to help the Iraqi 'people as a prerequisite for success lll .
After the unfortunate event UN withdrew for some time and then went in again only to
. maintain a very low profile in the country. At present UNDP, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WHO,
FAO, UNHCR and few other UN agencies are running numerous project in Iraq. This
role, however, is very limited compared to traditional peacekeeping and nation building
involvement of the UN.
Involvement of development organizations or NGO's in the reconstruction phase
may come as a relief. As Professor Monshipouri observed about Afghanistan,
"Without cooperation between NGOs, international organizations, civil society
and the state, it is virtually impossible to deal effectively with the country's humanitarian
crisis" 112
-same could be argued about Iraq. In describing how NGOs are contributing to the
peace building and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, he mentions the PEACE
(Poverty Eradication and Community Empowerment) initiative of the UNDP which sets

109

Id Para 8(e)
SCIRes/1500
111 In the report he stated, "The United Nations presence in Iraq remains vulnerable to any who would seek
to target our Organization, as recent events in Mosul - described in the Secretary-General's report illustrate. Our security continues to rely significantly on the reputation of the United Nations, our ability to
demonstrate, meaningfully, that we are in Iraq to assist its people, and our independence". Briefing to the
~ecurity Council by Sergio Vieira De Mello, July 22,2003
12 Mahmood Monshipouri, NGOs and Peace building in Afghanistan 10 International Peacekeeping 139
2004
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up village development committees (VDCs) to identify and supervise varIOUS
1

reconstruction efforts thus introducing national problem solving at the grass root level

13 •

While much attention had been given to economic reconstruction, the issues of
environment and protection of cultural heritage have gone unnoticed. During the first few
weeks of the occupation, Iraqi national museum was looted and valuable artifacts went
missing. Despite warnings from experts and previous experience from the 1991 Gulf war,
the coalition forces failed to take any measure to protect key archeological sites, libraries,
museums and historical buildings. Though the existing Iraqi laws offered adequate
protection for these possessions, priority of the occupying forces seem to favor protection
of the oil fields over these ancient heritage.
At the end of the 'Historic Review', there is a comparative chart of reconstruction
milestones for Post Saddam Iraq and Post WWll Germany. Though the case studies are
far from being of similar kind and thus not to be judged by the same yardstick, the
comparison itself speak of the mismanagement that went into Iraq (See the chart in
Annex 2). A rushed job in all spheres, the nation building exercise was bound to meet this
troubled conclusion.

The Transitional Administration in East Timor
East Timor had been a portuguese colony (or mentioned as being administered by
Portugal) until illdonesia intervened militarily and integrated the territory as its 27th
Province in 1976 114 . Followed by a failed attempt to impose autonomy in East Timor
under a unified illdonesian Government, The United Nations intervened and United
Id P142
Dmted Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor @
http://www.un.org/peace/etimorlUntaetB.htm retrieved on March 23,2007
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Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established through
SC Res. 1272 of 1999115 . Endowed with' overall responsibility for administration of East
Timor' and empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority including the
administration of justice,116 the UNT AET consisted of governance and public
administration civilian police force of 1640 policemen, a humanitarian assistance and
emergency response component, and an "armed UN peace keeping force of up to 8950
troops and 200 military observers 117 •
The UNT AET has been given a very specific mandate to 'provide security and
maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor', 'to establish an effective
administration', 'to assist in the development of civil and social services', 'to ensure the
coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development
assistance', 'to support capacity building for self-government', and 'to assist in the
establishment

of conditions

for

sustainable development' 118.

The

Transitional

administrator, who was appointed by the UN Secretary General, exercised the power to
enact new laws and amend, suspend or repeal existing ones. One of the first regulations
he decreed in this regard provided that until replaced by UNT AET or democratic
institutions of East Timor, laws in force in the region prior to October 1999 would
continue to be applied 119. At the same time he ordered that certain Indonesian security

115 For details on the unfolding of events in East Timor as described by the Peace and Security Section of
the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping,
mtp://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htmretrieved on March 23, 2007.
116
.
SC/ResI1272 (1999) retneved from
!n.tp://daccessdds.un.orgldocIUNDOC/GENIN99/312177IPDFIN9931277.pdf?OpenElement on March 23,

2007
117

Id
Id
119 Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Post Conflict Societies 95 Am. J. Int'I. L 82 2001
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laws would no longer be applied in East Timor120. Among the priorities of the UNT AET
administration was facilitating return and care of the refugees and displaced persons,
restoration of public services, rebuilding of the judiciary and law enforcement systems
and revival of economic activities.

Conclusion
A questionable invasion, a SC mandated authority over the occupied territory, drafting of
a permanent constitution and installing an elected government later the US led occupiers
are believed to be liable of multiple violations of international law. In order to determine
the development if any of international legal regime through these events, answers to the
questions posed at the beginning of this discussion it at utmost importance.

1. The coalition did not have the authority to go into Iraq:
Though legal scholars are divided in the issue, a careful reading of the UN Charter and its
relevant provisions on use of force clearly render the occupation illegal. The Secretary
General of the UN maintained from the beginning of the events leading to the invasion
that military action without the Security Council authorization would violate the Charter,
diplomatically avoiding the term 'illegal'. He broke his silence more than after a year of
the event stating in a BBC interview

120

Matheson p 82
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"1 have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter. From our point of

view andfrom the charter point of view it was illegal. ,,121

International law is clear in this issue. The charter outlaws the threat or use of
force in norms, which are recognized as jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international
law. The obligations to settle disputes through peaceful means 122, and refrain from using
or threat of using force against territorial integrity or political independence of other
states 123 are absolute for UN member states. Only the Security Council has the authority
to determine threat to peace and take actions accordingly124. States may act on their
inherent right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs 125 .
The last two points have been argued by the US led coalition. The argument that
SC Res 1441 provided an implied authority to use force against Iraq in case of noncooperation of the government, does not stand the test of legitimacy. As the resolution
warned Iraq of severe consequences but left the option open, it required another
resolution specifying the action. As per the self-defense argument, it did not meet the test
of necessity as decided in the Caroline case that necessity of self defense must be
" .. Instant, overwhelming, and leaving no moment for deliberation,,126. The claims

of Iraq's link to al Qaeda, carrying weapons of mass destruction, buying nuclear raw
materials from an African country all proved to be fabricated. The UN weapons Inspector
Hans Blix in Iraq never found any weapons of mass destruction, neither was there any
. imminent danger of terrorist attacks from Iraq to any other state. The UN Secretary
121
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See the report in September 162004 issue of Guardian newspaper @
~P:llwww.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763, 1305709,OO.html (Last visited April to, 2007)
123 Article 2(3) of UN Charter
124 Article 2(4) of UN Charter
12S Chapter VII of UN Charter
126 Article 51 of UN Charter
The Caroline Case, cross posted from International Law case book p 923
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General commented correctly that such trends of pre-emptive self-defense might lead to a
breakdown of international order. Around the fourth anniversary of Iraq invasion, there is
little doubt that the occupation was illegal as was the attack a clear violation of
intemationallaw.

2. The occupying power assumed legal authority to govern Iraq:
Though the Security Council refused the request of the US and UK to pass a resolution
authorizing an attack in Iraq, after the occupation was established the UN organ seem to
have changed its tone towards the coalition. Within months of the attack, effective
occupation followed and UN recognized their authority under laws of war. It is
interesting to observe that war has been outlawed in the previous century; even the term
has been replaced by armed conflict. The Security Council called upon the 'Authority' as
it called the occupiers to 'promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective
administration of the territory' consistent with the Charter and other relevant international
law. The resolution goes on to prescribe Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague
Regulation of 1907 to the authority notwithstanding the fact that the basis of the
formation of such authority was a mere violation of the Charter.
After the formal recognition from the UN, the occupiers were to govern Iraq
within the mandate of the SC resolution, laws of war and relevant international law . All
the international human rights instruments that both the occupiers and Iraq have ratified
should have been applied in Iraq. The authority, however, have shown indifference to
these rules and argued that the Geneva Conventions should be the only legislation
applicable under the circumstances. As a result, the authority interpreted the SC mandate
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at its advantage and governed the occupied territory. It can be argued that the authority's
legality was contingent upon the observance of international humanitarian and all
relevant international law. The failure to take that fact in account rendered this authority
legal yet exercising illegitimate power.

3. The Transitional Authority governed exceeding its scope and limits:
The SC resolution and laws of occupation conferred upon the CPA responsibility to
restore law and order in the first place and to facilitate a smooth transition to democratic
institutions without amending fundamental structures of the government. CPA itself
mentioned its priorities to be reconstruction the areas of Security, Governance, Essential
services and Economy.
Whereas the CPA and subsequently the Governing Council, Interim
Administration and Transitional Government all failed to provide minimum security and
essential services for the people, drastic changes have been made to the country's
governance and economic structure. As the authority brought about new laws permitting
absolute privatization in Iraq, US companies like Halliburton, Bechtel, DynCorp and like
harvested the profit to the extent that $19.6 billion used for reconstruction was
mismanaged. Iraq's economy went into becoming market economy from a protective
socialist system almost overnight.
The governance structure also met with new challenges. The TAL drafted by the
Governing Council under heavy influence of the CPA introduced Islam as an influential
Source of legislation, brokered a sectarian electoral system many blame for Iraq's current
'vil war situation and prescribed a weak federal government system. Though the TAL
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was meant for the governance of the transitional period, many of its provisions found
their way to the permanent constitution.
The transitional authority left behind a legacy of gross human rights violation,
prison abuse, extrajudicial killing together with awarding immunity for the multinational
force. Today's Iraq is a painful reminder of the ill planning and strategic mismanagement
of the transitional period.

4. The transitional authority added new dimension to the existing sovereignty
principle:
International law recogmzes the notion of sovereignty established by the treaty of
Westphalia (1648) and bases its principle of non-interference by other states on this
traditional approach. The occupation force attacked the territorial and political
independence of Iraq violating the non interference principle mandated by the UN
charter. This violation was overridden by the Security Council as it vested the occupying
power with responsibilities of governance in accordance with international law. Whether
the Security Council acted within its authority to supersede the violation is another area
that must be explored; but in this case there is nothing to suggest otherwise.
The modem approach to sovereignty subject the states to its people and " ... states
are bound by many rules which have not been ordered by their will,,127. As the concept of
state sovereignty evolves around globalization and international co-operation, "The State
is now widely understood to be the servant of its people,,128. This approach dictates that

I nd'Ividual Opinion by Judge Alvarez in Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania),ICJ 1949
.
128
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's Annual Speech to the UN General Assembly on September 20
127

P~a43

1999
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sovereignty in law always remained with the Iraqi people even during the occupation.
Sovereignty in fact or the power of executing state's will switched hands multiple times
as different bodies assumed the roles of transitional authority. Since the elected
transitional administration was the only body directly responsible to the Iraqi people, it
may be regarded as the only time during the transitional phase that the sovereignty of the
Iraqi people was truly respected. Thus more questions arise as I try to find the answer
posed as the beginning of this section. This unique situation presented by the legitimacy
and governance issues of the transitional authority in Iraq requires further attention to the
research on the principle of sover:eignty.
As I move forward with a discussion of the constitution making, treatment of
women and attempt to secure post conflict justice in Iraq, I will present the new
developments and concerns faced by the transitional authority through this process.

II;
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Chapter III
The Constitution of Iraq: A feeble document born to a hasty
process

I
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I

Introduction
"The Constitution is a fundamental document. . ..... the purpose of a Constitution is not
merely to create the organs of the State but to limit their authority, because,

if no

limitation was imposed upon the authority of the organs, there will be complete tyranny
and complete oppression. The legislature may be free to frame any law; the executive
may be free to take any decision; and the Supreme Court may be free to give any
interpretation of the law. It should result in utter chaos"
(Dr. Ambedkar, Framing of India's Constitution, vol 1 p 832)129
Constitution is considered to be the most important legal document for any
country. In most .parts of the world it is the supreme authority that is expected to define
the authority of state officials, affirm the claim to sovereignty and build legitimate and
effective institutions 130. This probably explains the urgency that the transitional authority
in Iraq felt to draft a new constitution at the earliest opportunity. On October 15 2005 the
Iraqis adopted a constitution through referendum that was drafted by members from
elected

National

Assemblyl31. The

'historical

legacy

of

deeply

flawed

constitutionalism,132 under colonial or dictatorial regimes helped to create expectation
among Iraqis for a due process and truly progressive constitution after the fall of Saddam

129
130

Legally Speaking, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, Universal Law Publishing Co Pvt Ltd. P 27
For more on this see in general, Nathanj. Brown, Constitutions in a Neoconstitutional World: Basic
. ~ws and Prospects for Accountable Government (2002)
. The Elected Iraqi Transitional Government appointed members of the constitution drafting committee
from among the National Assembly and few Sunni members from outside the Assembly as t~ey boycotted
. ~ January '05 election. See Annex 1 for the complete list of members.
Iraq's Constitutional Challenge, ICG Middle East Report No 19, 13 November 2003, p2

57

Hussein.

133

The success of drafting a new constitution for Iraq was conditional to proper

attention to divergence in Iraq (Shiites, Sunnis, Kurdish and other minorities), The Iraqi
exile community, regional interests, Islam factor, internal conflicts and international
agendas while confirming the participation of the commoners in mind. The outcome was
a feeble constitution born in a hasty process.
'In this chapter I argue that neither the constitution nor the constitution making

process met the expectations of the Iraqis or those of the observers of the event. That the
new constitution failed to provide solutions for existing problems in a divided community
and in many cases further exacerbated the conflict of interests among rival groups. While
looking at the Iraqi constitution making process, I draw from the experience of another
conflict stricken country Afghanistan and compare the two in order to provide a real life
analysis of the phenomenon. In case of the constitution itself, I talk about the previous
constitutions of Iraq to explain the points of departure from earlier oppressive regimes
and try to analyze the effect of that in the Iraqi society.

Inside the Constitution
.,i
,j

Derived from the Latin word 'praeambulum' meaning 'walking before', Preambles are

,

!

important features of constitutions. They are not merely introductory paragraphs and bear

I

i

long reaching effects. They are sometimes described to hold the mission statement of this
, important document. There are many different types of Preambles written; some describe

I

I

i I

I
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" Constitutions of 1876, 1925, 1958, 1970 and 1990 together with few other interim constitutions were in
in Iraq before the occupation.
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the struggle for creating a national identity, some talk about historical journey to a
constitution, some remember the colonial oppression and vow to create a society that will
ensure justice for all its citizens. There are exceptions as well. For example, in the case of
the constitution of India, the largest constitution of the world consisting 560 Articles and
amendments, the preamble simply mentions the fundamental principles yet serving two
purposes:
A) It indicates the source from which the Constitution derives its authority;
B) It also states the objects, which the Constitution seeks to establish and promote.
The Preamble of the Iraq constitution begins with Islamic connotation 'In the name of
God, the Most merciful, the Most compassionate' followed by , We have honored the
sons of Adam' putting a secular character of the State in question. It goes on to describe
historical events supporting ancient national identity, remembering atrocities committed
in its soil and aspiring to build a new country from the ruins" .. .so we sought hand in
hand and shoulder to shoulder to create our new Iraq, the Iraq for the future, free from

sectarianism, racism, complex of regional attachment, discrimination, and exclusion". It
is interesting to note that nowhere the occupying force is mentioned.
The Preamble mentions the future system to be, " republican, federal, democratic

and pluralistic" and considers the principles of respecting the rule of law, establishing
justice and equality, casting aside the politics of aggression, paying attention to women
• and their rights, the elderly and their concerns and children and their affairs, spreading
. culture of diversity and defusing terrorism to be the determination of Iraqi-population.
•Controversy arose around few of its underlying meanings- "we, the people of Iraq, of all
components and across the spectrum, ..... decide freely and by choice to unite our
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future ... " being subject to much of it. The Iraqi union being a voluntary decision
according to those lines may have been inserted as a Kurdish agenda because it can imply
right of secession. 134 Even the history version of the preamble seems to favor Shiite and
Kurdish interpretations of it. 135 Unlike the preamble of the Afghan constitution, it fails to
specify objectives in clear and concise manner and omits promise of observing the United
Nations charter and adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 136 .

Section 1: Basic Principles

Article 1: Despite demands from Islamic groups in the drafting committee, and emphasis

on religious traditions, the country's name was not changed into Islamic State of Iraq.
. According to the first Article, the name remains "The Republic of Iraq" same as since the
overthrow of the Monarchy in 1958137. This Article describes Iraq as a single federal,
independent and a sovereign state with a republican, representative, parliamentary and
democratic system of government. It also establishes the constitution as one of the
guarantors of the unity of Iraq. It may, however, be interesting to follow whether the
Course of Kurdish demand of a separate state derives strength from the preamble or faces
significant challenge from this provision.

134

Nathan 1. Brown, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "The Final Draft of

~e Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary"
; Id
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136
137

.

Preamble of Afghan Constitution promises observance of the UN Charter and respect for the UDHR.
The British installed Monarchy that ruled Iraq since 1932 was overthrown by a bloody military coup in
1958.
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Article 2: This Article declares Islam to be the official religion of Iraq. Though majority
of the population adhere to Islamic faith, Iraq had been avoiding religious connotations at
the state level for a long time. It was hailed to be the only secular country in the religiondominated Middle East. Through this declaration Iraq not only lost its secular character
but also opened the door of uncontested religious teachings at school, funding for
religious institutions etc.
This Article also bars enactment of any law that may contradict any established
provision of Islamic law. This provision leaves the option of problematic interpretations
of established provisions of Islamic law. For example, if the Iraqi parliament has a
majority of Shiites who decide to follow Iranian interpretation of Islam; women may
loose their right to be judges 138. Interestingly the next few provisions appear to contradict
each other. They bar enactment of any law that may contradict principles of democracy
and rights and freedoms stipulated in the constitution. It will be an interesting task for
scholars to observe how the claim of Islam being 'a foundation source of legislation'
plays out in this regard. Whether Islamic rules, democratic rights or constitutional
freedoms will dominate future Iraqi citizens' lives, will depend on the interpretation of
this Article. One breathing point, however, is that this provision does not have
retrospective status, accordingly applying only to new legislation. It may still be a
Concern if previous legislation is put forward for a judicial review and found to be
unconstitutional under this provision.
Center of a great deal of attention, this provision may seem contradictory in some
respect but it may have little practical effect on existing Iraqi legal structure.

138

After the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, women judges lost their jobs; one of them being Noble
Laureate Shirin Ebadi.
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Article 3: Confirming with previous constitutions, this Article recognizes Iraq's multiple
nationalities, religions and sects. Subject to many protests from the Sunni sectors, this
provision fails to mention Iraq as an Arab state yet recognizing its binding
responsibilities under the Charter of the Arab League. A constitutional expert calls this
compromise 'ironic' as binding the country constitutionally to an international document
like the Charter of the Arab League could have far more practical implications than
allowing it to a symbolic status of Arab State 139 .

Article 4: The Constitution stipulates both The Arabic and the Kurdish language to be the
official languages of Iraq which involves recognizing rights including publication of the
Official Gazette in both the languages, speeches, conversation and expression in official
domains in either of the two languages, having bank notes, passports and stamps in either
of the two languages etc.
Other language groups like Turkomen, Assyrians and Armenian have also been awarded
the right to be educated in their mother tongues. The Turkik and Syriac languages are
also official languages in administrative units where these groups constitute density of
population. The Constitution allows each region discretionary power to adopt other local
: languages as official ones if people of that region approves of it in a regional referendum.

Article 5 & 6: These two provisions reiterate the democratic pillars of the new Iraqi
Constitution, "The people are the source of authority and legitimacy', they shall exercise
authority through constitutional institutions and authority will be transferred through
Nathan Brown, Article 3: Identity.
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democratic means. Though they appear to be safeguards against hostile take over of the
government, constitutional guarantees have never prevented revolutionaries, military
leaders or terrorists from toppling a democratic government 140 •

Article 7: The Constitution bans the Saddamist Ba'ath in Iraq, its symbols and other like
organizations or programs that "adopts, incites, facilitates, glorifies, promotes or justifies
racism or terrorism or accusations of being an infidel (takfir) or ethnic cleansing". There

is no clear indication of prohibiting Ba'ath party ideology reintroducing itself under a
different name.

Article 8, 9:

The constitution stipulates Iraq's observance of principles of good

neighborliness, adherence of principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, respect for international obligations.
Article 9 deals extensively with Iraqi armed forces, security services and intelligence
services. The Constitution tries to keep the armed forces out of governing power by
measures that include prohibiting their interference in political affairs and banning them
from taking part in national election for public offices. This Article also goes to the heart
ofthe alleged conflict by reiterating Iraq's obligations relating to the non-proliferation of
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

140

For example, despite constitutional guarantees of a democratic government elected by the people,
.. Bangladesh has suffered multiple military dictatorships between 1975 and 1982 during which the
. Constitution remained suspended for the most part.
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Article 13: This Article declares Constitution the supreme law of Iraq and stipulates that
laws that contradict the constitution cannot be enacted. This provision may provide sense
of security to Iraqis who think Kurds may want to override constitution and also to those
who are worried about Islamic law prevailing over the Constitution.

Section 2: Rights and Liberties

In modern Constitutions, especially in the ones under profound western
,

influence 141 placing emphasis on the rights regime is a popular phenomenon.
Safeguarding those rights or structural guarantees is not taken seriously. As a result many.
Constitutions offer promising liberties without securing their enjoyment for the citizens.
Similar thoughts may arise while reviewing the chapter 2 of Iraqi Constitution.
The Constitution guarantees (notwithstanding with the exceptions) the following rights to
Iraqi citizens among others:

Civil and Political Rights
1. Right to equality before the law without being discriminated on the grounds of
gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, origin, color, religion, sect, belief or opinion,
or economic or social status;
2. Right to enjoy life, security and liberty;
3. Right to equal opportunity;
4. Right to privacy and protection of the sanctity of homes;
141

• . For example, consider the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh where numerous human
• nghts have been awarded to citizens, the implementation of which are not duly supported or monitored by
an effective infrastructure.
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5. Right to Iraqi citizenship through father or mother, right to mUltiple citizenships
except for special cases;
6. Right to independent judiciary; litigation, public trials, defense lawyer at the
expense of the state in cases of inability to pay, safeguard from unlawful detention
etc;
7. Right to participate in public affairs, vote, elect and run for office;
8. Right not to be extradited;

Economic, Social and Cultural Liberties

1. Right to work;
2. Right to enjoy, benefit, exploit and dispose of private property;
3. Freedom of movement;
4. Right to exemption from taxes for low income earners;
5. Right to preservation of family, religious, moral and national values;
6. Right to social and health security;
7. Right to health care;
8. Right of the handicapped to rehabilitation;
9. Right to live in safe environmental conditions;
10. Right to education with mandatory primary education;
11. Right to practice sports;

Liberties:

1. Protection of liberty and dignity of man;
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2. Protection from extrajudicial imprisonment or investigation;
3. Protection from psychological, physical torture and inhumane treatment;
4. Protection from intellectual, political and religious coercion;
5. Protection from forced labor, slavery, slave trade, trafficking and sex trade;
6. Freedom of expression, press, printing, advertisement, media, publication,
assembly, peaceful demonstration etc;
7. Freedom to form and join associations and political parties;
8. Right to avoid forceful subscription to any party, society or political party;
9. Freedom of communication;
10. Freedom of thought, conscience and belief;
11. Freedom of practice of religious rites, worship etc
12. Freedom of movement;

Some guarantees of the Constitution can be hailed as progressive and
complementary to internationally guaranteed rights, in many cases overcoming
shortcomings of regional patterns. Offering Iraqi citizenship to children born from an
Iraqi mother is a rare right available to Muslim especially Middle Eastern women around
the world. There are other promising provisions as well For example, prohibition against
economic exploitation of children, State's responsibility to rehabilitate the disabled and
people with special needs, undertaking the duty to protect and preserve the environment,
support for indigenous Iraqi cultural orientations, prohibition of torture- and inhumane
treatment, prohibition of forced labor, slavery, trafficking of women and children, sex
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trade etc, strengthening the role of civil society and support them in many ways,
prohibiting tribal traditions violating human rights 142 etc.
Similarly, some provisions may seem too conservative for world standards such as
prohibition on expropriation of private property, restrictions on extradition and allowing
political refugees to stay as long as they are not accused of international or terrorist
crimes. In the last scenario, it is not clear if Iraq would entertain a warrant against a
political asylum seeker from the ICC since it is not a signatory of the treaty.
Few provisions may raise eyebrows as they deal with topics usually dealt with by ,
regularly elected government. The State undertakes to guarantee reform of the Iraqi
economy in accordance with modem economic principles ensuring the full investment of
its resources, diversification of its sources and the encouragement and development of the
private sector without reserving exclusive government control over any sector of the
economy.
The common human rights guarantees in the Constitution seem to have inherent
problems in them. The right to personal privacy is guaranteed so long as it does not

contradict the rights of others and public moral/ 43 -without explaining the standard for
determination of public morals. The freedom of communication in all its forms is subject
to monitoring, wiretapping or disclosing for legal and security necessity and by a judicial

decision l44 - a reminder of the Patriot Act in the USA in the aftermath of the Twin tower
attack 145 . Public order and morality are conditions for the enjoyment of freedom of

In many parts of the world women suffer from genital mutilation as part of cultural tradition.
Article 17
144 Article 40
145 The Uniting and Straightening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) or Patriot Act of 2001 curtailed civil rights of citizens
Significantly through surveillance. For a complete text of the ACT as revised in 2006 and official

142
143
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expression as well as many basic rights. Critics point out that some basic freedoms have
been left to be determined by law, a phrasing that many of Iraq's neighbors have turned
. Iooph0 Ies146 .
into gapmg

Last but not the least of the concerns is no where in the Constitution its mentioned
how these rights and liberties are to be safeguarded, no structural guarantees are
mentioned anywhere.

Section 3: Federal Powers

Federal legislative, executive and judicial powers are exercised on the basis of the
principle of separation of powers.
Legislative authority is vested

In

the Council of Representatives (COR) and

Federation Council. The members of the COR, 1 in every 100,000, are elected through
secret ballot representing different groups of the people of Iraq. The COR is also
expected to host at least one fourth women members in its composition. The members
elect the speaker and two of his deputies by absolute majority of the Council. The COR is
empowered enact a law by two third majority of its members to establish the 'Federation
Council' which includes representation from the regions and governorates that are not
organized in a region. The COR also regulates the FCs formation, membership
conditions, components and everything relevant to it.
Among the powers of the COR, the following are noteworthy:
•

Enacting federal laws

documents relating to that see US Department of Justice website at
~P:I/www .lifeandliberty. gOYlindex. html
Nathan Brown
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•

Monitoring the performance of the executive authority

•

Electing the President of the Republic

•

Regulating the process of ratification of international treaties and agreements

•

Impeaching the President by an absolute majority of members after he has
been convicted by the Federal Supreme Court on the grounds of perjury of the
Constitutional oath or violating the Constitution or high treason etc.

Federal executive power is vested in the President of the Republic and the Council of
Ministers.
The President is the Head of the State and guarantees "the commitment to the
Constitution and the preservation of Iraq's independence, sovereignty, unity, and the
safety of its territories ... ,,147. The COR elects the President for four years.
The nominee from the largest COR bloc forms the Council of Ministers (COM) within 15
days from the election of the President. After the formation of the COM, it must gain the
vote of confidence from the COR, individual Ministers and the ministerial program. As
the direct executive authority, the Prime Minister deals with the general policy of the
State and performs as the commander in chief of the armed forces at the same time.

The Federal judicial power is independent and is comprised of many Federal courts
including

147

•

The Higher Judicial Council

•

The Federal Supreme Court

.
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•

The Federal Court of Cassation

•

The Public Prosecution Department

•

The Judiciary Oversight Commission etc.

The methods of establishment of these courts, their authorities and modes of
operation are left in many instances to enactment of laws by the COR and not provided in
the Constitution. The Higher Judicial Council manages the affairs of the Judiciary and
supervises the Federal JUdiciary. Among its other responsibilities are presenting the
nominations to the COR for the Chief Justice and members of the Federal Court of
Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Oversight
Commission and propose the draft of the annual budget of the Federal Judicial Authority
To the COR.
The crucial responsibility of interpreting the Constitution and overseemg the
constitutionality of laws and regulations in effect lie with the Federal Supreme Court
which is composed of experts in Islamic jurisprudence and legal scholars together with a
number of judges.
The Constitution prohibits laws stipulating immunity from appeal" for any
. administrative action or decision. The Constitution provides for the establishment of
independent commissions- the High Commission for Human Rights, the Independent
Electoral Commission and the Commission on Public Integrity which are to be monitored
"by the COR. There is also provision for a Martyrs' Foundation which is to be established

and attached to the COM.
4 of the Constitution deals with the powers of the Federal Government who is to

... ... preserve the unity, integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Iraq and its federal
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democratic system" 148. The areas where the Federal government exercises exclusive
authority include formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating,
signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; negotiating, signing and
ratifying debt policies; formulating foreign sovereign economic and trade policy;
formulating and executing national security policy; formulating fiscal and customs
policy; drawing up the national budget of the state; formulating monetary policy;
regulating issues of citizenship, naturalization, etc; planning policies relating to water
sources from outside Iraq and its just distribution inside Iraq etc 149 . The policy regarding
oil and gas management, the subject of much speculation, is to be determined by the
federal government with the producing governorates and regional governments whereas
people of Iraq are declared the owner of the asset in the Constitution 150. Several powers
are shared between the federal government and regional authorities such as managing
customs; regulating the main sources of electrical energy and its distribution; formulating
environmental policy; formulating development and general planning policies;
formulating public health policy; formulating the public educational and instructional
policy and formulating and regulating internal water resources policy etc 151 • Antiquities,
archeological sites, cultural buildings, manuscripts, coins etc are regarded to be national
treasures under the jurisdiction of the federal government and are managed in cooperation
with the authorities of regions and governorates. 152The Constitution leaves a loophole in
the system by providing that powers that are not stipulated as the exclusive powers
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belonging to the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and
governorates that are not organized in a region. I53
Section five of the Constitution sets out the framework for regional powers. The
Iraqi Federal system is described to be made up of a decentralized capital, regions and
governorates as well as local adrninistrations. 154 At the moment Kurdistan is the only
region existing in Iraq and recognized by the Constitution as SUCh. I55 The establishment
of regions is regulated by the law the COR created within six months of its first session.
Kurdistan and other regions that may form in accordance with the prescribed law are
required to adopt their own Constitutions which will define the "structure of powers of

the region, its authorities and the mechanisms for exercising such authorities" without
contradicting the federal Constitution. I56 Kurdistan and all future regions are entitled to
the right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with the
federal Constitution as long as it does not overlap with the exclusive authority allowed to
the federal government; right to an equitable share of the national revenues considering
their resources, needs and percentage of their population; right to establish and organize
internal security forces of the region etc.

157

Iraq has 18 governorates which are made up of districts, sub districts and Villages.
The formation of the Governorate Council and the governor as well as their powers is
determined by the law enacted by the COR. The Constitution takes a step ahead of many
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as it guarantees the administrative, political, cultural and educational rights of various
minority nationalities namely Turkomen, Chaldeans, and Assyrians etc. 158
Section 6 of the Constitution holds the final and transitional provisions. It is safe to
assume that amendment of the Constitution is discouraged as the requirement suggest.
The President and the COM collectively or the one fifth of the COR members may
propose an amendment. Fundamental principles and the rights and liberties awarded in
the Constitution may not be amended by the first two elected federal governments. At the
third term, the proposal to amend must be approved by two-thirds of the COR members,
passed in a general referendum by the people and ratified by the President of the
Republic within seven days. 159All other provisions may be amended without the
prohibition on first two terms following the same approval process of the COR, people
and the President. What may prove to be controversial in terms of Kurdistan is the
Constitutional safeguard against taking powers away from the regions that are not
exclusively awarded to the federal government except where the legislative authority of
the region approves such decision and the people of the region ratifies it. The
Constitution guarantees all existing laws at the time of the Drafting of the Constitution to
be in force unless annulled or amended in accordance with the Constitution. 160
The last few provisions of the Constitution deal with the transitional provisions. Among
the unique features are care for the families of the martyrs, political prisoners and victims
of the Saddam regime; compensation for the families of the martyrs and the injured
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victims of terrorist acts. 161 This special feature fails to mention victims of terrorism and
armed intervention during the transitional phase.

Dissecting the process of Constitution Making

Gone are the days of traditional Constitution making also referred to as 'old
Constitutionalism 'where few elite members of a society prescribes their view points on
the future of a society, its perceived virtue being "Constitution making as an act of
completion,,162. In the 21 st Century, Constitution making is not limited to a few members
of a society; it has almost become the mandate of any democratic society to involve its
population in what is known as 'participatory Constitution making'. To meet the
challenges of modem societies facing ethnic violence, economic liberalization, and
globalization in general, constitutions must not only include the pillars of legal and social
institutions within a country but also take into account people's opinion of it. This new
Constitutionalism is both international and comparative in nature in the sense that they
involve experts from around the world and derive from experiences of other communities
like never before in the history of constitution making 163 . Constitutions created
confirming to this new process have been called merely 'constructed' rather than
'designed,l64It is debatable which mode of Constitution making is more successful
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between the two but it may be agreeable that" the process does move incrementally
closer to the needs of the present day" 165
International law has long advocated for people's participation in the political
processes and public affairs of their country166. The Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights further stressed the right recognized in Article 25 of ICCPR, " Peoples
have the right to freely determine their political status and to enjoy the right to choose the
form of their constitution and governmenC 167
Where drafting a Constitution is a difficult undertaking for any country, the Iraqi
attempt of participatory Constitution making met with multiple challenges doing the
same. The complex mosaic of ethnic religious composition of Iraqi society, post-conflict
reconstruction measures, presence of foreign troops posed as hurdles for the drafters.
They fought to introduce a document that could unify different groups under the 'Iraqi
nationality' theme as well as to rebuild a state structure destroyed by over two decades of
authoritarian rule. The main points of consideration were

165

•

Introducing democratic state rule

•

Unifying different ethnic-religious groups

•

Establish human rights regime & state structures for safeguarding the same

•

Facilitating the growth of civil society

Democratic Constitution Making: Vivian Hart, Special USIP Report, p 2

. 166 Article

21 ,of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 25 of the International Covenant on
CiVil and Political Rights; Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Political Rights; Article 5.2 of
the Commonwealth Harare Declaration; Article 7.2 of the Asian Human Rights Charter; Article 6 of the
f~ter American Democratic Charter all advocate for people's participation in state's political framework.
"The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service,"
General Comment, Office ofthe High Commissioner for Human Rights, No.25, 1996 at Para.2. Retrieved
from http://www.unhchr.chltbs/doc.nsf/O/dOb7f023e8d6d9898025651e004bcOeb ?Opendocument on
12/08/06
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As predicted by experts, " The efforts to overcome these hurdles and find common

ground among Iraqi political interests will occur in the context of a lack of democratic
history in Iraq and the absence of suitable regional models,,168 the drafting process met
with severe shortcomings.

Political Will:
Recent examples of Cambodia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor &
Afghanistan suggest that international community or foreign powers playa great role in
post conflict constitution making as part of their roles in the conflict resolution. With the
agenda of an early exit from the territory international community involved may advocate
a "simple procedure involving a comparatively small number of stake holders and a
narrow agenda" rather than a procedure that includes a large number of individuals and
groups discussing a wider agenda 169 . It can be argued that same interests dominated the
case of Iraq. Though Iraqi National Congress (mostly comprised of formerly exiled
Iraqis), the Kurdish political parties and the formerly exiled Shi'a community released
their versions of draft constitutions aspiring a democratic Iraq. The views of the majority
of Iraq's population not being publicly available make room for the speculation of
whether they had been consulted at all. Among these views, the Kurdish one can be
credited as comprising the opinions of majority, which is representative of only 15-20%
of Iraqis. Though all the proposals demanded fully democratic Iraq, they varied in the
format of expected federalism. The INC draft called for a heavily centralized· federalism;
168

Establishing a stable democratic constitutional structure in Iraq: Some basic considerations, report by
PUblic International Law and Policy Group and the Century Foundation, May 2003, page 2, retrieved from

~~P:I/www.pilpg.org

Ghai, Yash, Lattimer, M. & Said, &Y. "Building Democracy in Iraq," Minority Rights Group
International Report, United Kingdom, 2003 at 27
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the Shi'a segment mentioned federalism only in its broadest sense in a unified Iraq and
the Kurdish proposal advocated an equal power sharing between Kurdish and Arab
provinces at the federal level. The compromise is a federal government where the
Kurdish region enjoys important powers with many fundamental authorities remaining
with the federal government. 170 From the process described by numerous sources, it is
apparent that the political will of the elites dominated the constitution making process
where the common people experienced everyday bloodbath in the aftermath of the Iraq
occupation.

Participatory Constitution making:

In post Saddam Iraq, the Iraqi media, exile political voices, existing interested parties
together with US administration and the UN shared an understanding that the first
reconstructive effort in Iraq should be establishing constitutional democracy. This
enthusiasm may be compared with the situation in Afghanistan, a country with rather
'remarkable history of constitutional activism ,171. Unlike its 7 other constitutions since

1923, the constitution of 2004 emerged from a participatory process trying to uphold
national unity in a multi ethnic state in post conflict situation. The expectation of Afghan
people of a participatory process rose because of the UN involvement after the fall of
Taliban and progressive language of the Bonn Agreement. 172The international
community involvement had a similar effect on Iraqi population. The pressure from Iraqi
shiia leader Grand Ayatollah Sistani successfully resisted a Constitution by US
170

For more on this see the Report n 165
The Role of Constitution Building Processes in Democratization, International Idea Report, 2004;
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appointees as ambitioned by the Coalition Provisional Authority 173Confirrning with
present trend of participatory constitution making, the TAL hinted on a transparent
drafting process. Article 60 of the TAL stipulates that in writing the draft of the
permanent constitution for Iraq, the NA shall be responsible for "encouraging debate on
the constitution through regular general public meetings in all parts of Iraq and through
the media, and receiving proposals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes the
constitution.,,174 The Security Council joined the appeal in resolution 1546 where it
mandated the special Representative of the Secretary General and UNAMI on the request
of the Iraqi government to play a leading role to "promote national dialogue and
consensus-building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people of Iraq,,175.
The demand for public participation got momentum among other interested parties
because of the non-transparent and secretive process that the CPA applied in drafting the
TAL. In their focus group report published in June 'OS, the NDI stated that among the
Iraqi men and women citizen participation is seen as important and the Iraqis wanted
their voice to be heard 176.

173 USIP Report Page 5, retrieved from http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr155.pdf; Accessed on
th
29 November, 2006
174 Article 60 of the TAL retrieved from http://www.cpa-irag.org/governmentITAL.html. Accesses on 29th
November, 2006
175 SClRES/1546 (2004); Retrieved from
h..ttp:lldaccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GENIN04/381116IPDFIN0438116.pdf?OpenElement; Accessed on
th
29 November, 2006
176 Iraqi Voices: Public Attitudes and Political Opportunity in Transition, Findings from Focus Groups with
Iraqi Men and Women (Conducted April 13-15, 2005); National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs. P-9. Retrieved from http://www.accessdemocracy.orgllibraryIl921 ig focus groups 060105.pdf,
Accessed on 29 November, 2006
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Iraqi Constitution Drafting Committee:
rd

Iraqi transitional government that exercised authority over Iraq from 3 May '05 to 20

th

May '06 appointed members of the Iraqi Constitutional drafting committee to draft a new
constitution for post conflict Iraq.

The members by political affiliation were:
United Iraqi Alliance - 28
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan - 15
The Iraqis - 8
Communist Party of Iraq - 1
Iraqi Turkmen Front - 1
National Rafidain List - 1
Sunni Arab nominee - 1 (later expanded to 15)
Iraqi Sunni groups comprising about 15-20% of the total population boycotted
2005 election on the grounds that it was heavily under US influence. They however
expressed interest in participating in the Constitution drafting process only to be included
in the process by late July '05. In a similar situation, the Afghan Constitutional
COmmittee created by a Presidential decree in October '02 consisted of 9 experts
including 2 women. I77 After this committee presented a draft in March '03, the President
created a review commission of 35 members of whom seven were women consisting of
legal experts, tribal leaders, religious scholars, professionals, academics and community
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Timeline:
Guided by the Bonn agreement 178 and its promise of participatory Constitution making to
heal Afghan wounds, four different phases were adopted to introduce a new Constitution.
The adoption of the Constitution at the Loya Jirga 179 was preceded by an initial drafting
process, consultation with interested parties, revision of the draft and final debate 18o . In
case of Iraq the concerned authority was allowed very little time for the drafting process.
The TAL required the NA to complete the drafting process by August 15, '05 unless it
appeals to the Presidency Council for an extension of maximum six months with the
approval of majority of the members 181 . As pointed out by USIP, "The US Government's
strong demarches stand out as the principal reason for the Assembly ultimately declining
the TAL extension provision on August

1,,182.

Though it is doubtful whether the drafting

committee, facing resignations, walkouts by Sunni Arabs, Kurdish and other
representatives over their differences over federal arrangements would have been able to
utilize any extended period to its benefit, compressed timeframe affected many issues.

December 5,2001 a few weeks after the US a~d its allies toppled Afghan Taliban Government the
'Bonn agreement' was signed among representatives of various Afghan factions under the auspices of
Special representative of the UN Secretary General to decide the course of Afghanistan's future. Full
agreement can be retrieved at http://www.un.orglNews/dhllatestlafghanlafghan-agree.htm .
179 Traditionally Loya Jirga in Afghanistan is meant to refer to meetings of religious, political and
government leaders belonging to different tribes to decide on important issues. In this case, /loya Jirga
refers to the 502 elected and appointed delegates to consider the Afghan Constitution in 2003.
180 p 12
181 Article 61 A & 61 F of the TAL, retrieved from http://www.cpa-irag.org/governmentlTAL.html,
Accesses on 29 November, 2006
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There was not enough time to understand Sunni Arab groups' objection to
federalism and their concerns of it leading to divided Iraq and civil war. Looking at
today's reality of widespread sectarian violence, the importance of that step is well felt.
As the Sunni groups got involved very late in the drafting process, there was little time to
prepare for a useful dialogue on the issues. The negotiations as well as the drafting
process as a whole suffered from this.

International Involvement:

The timeframe also did not allow the UN and international experts either to mediate the
negotiations or to provide informative inputs from around the world to the benefit of the
process. The UNAMI led by Nicholas Haysom got involved only in June after being
invited by the Iraqi Govt. USIP brought in Constitutional expert Yash Ghai 183 who
referred extensively to comparative constitutional models explaining that "federalism far
from precipitating the break up of the state, in fact might hold Iraq together,,184. Both of
these valuable resources failed to leave useful impact on the process because of the short
timeframe. After the NA denied request for an extension of the framing period, the US
administration got directly involved in the drafting phase only to increase resentment
within the Sunni groups. On August 12, the US Embassy went as far as circulating their
version of a Constitution for Iraq 185. The visibility of US influence on the draft
constitution created a negative feeling among many Iraqis and was felt during the
ratification phase.

183
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International presence was felt in Afghanistan Constitution making through
funding, substantive advice and space availability by the United Nations and few other
foreign entities 186 . World-renowned constitutional experts Guy Carcassonne, Yash Pal
Ghai and Barnett Rubin were present and assisted the process significantly yet "The
process has not been in any way akin to that offoreigners writings and nationals rubber
stamping a new Constitution,,187.

Representation of Groups:

Though civil society organizations were able to raise their points but they did not leave
adequate influence on the draft because of the lack of institutional framework. Iraq
. foundation for Development and Democracy188, a well reputed organization proposed an
independent Constitutional Commission to work alongside the official one and raise civil
society views. The Thaqalayn Research Institute a Shiia religious NGO created a forum
to educate religious Shiia community on the value of constitutionalism and bring its
views to the Commission. 189 Both these initiatives along with others failed to represent
the civil society views in a useful manner.

Participation of Women:

The drafting committee had Six Women members and did not pay much attention to
women's groups' demands with regards to the draft Constitution. In a statement released
by Iraqi Women's Network on July 21 '05, concerns are expressed that none of the issues
186
187
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188 Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy is a regional non governmental organization that
s\upports dialogue between decision-makers and citizens on different issues of national interest.
89
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that this group discussed with the sub committee of chapter on rights, duties and liberties
were taken into consideration 190. The group even complained of the reception they got
from the committee, "At the beginning of the meeting they tried to prevent us from
reading our memo under the pretext of shortage of time! The meeting was held upon our
request and we're astonished of a good number of Islamist women have been invited to
attend it as an attempt to confuse the meeting. It was the first opportunity for us as
representing active part of the civil society orgs to meet with the sub-drafting committee.
We've expressed our worry about very short time behind the drafting committee to
accomplish its work in a close door,,191

In the Afghanistan scenario women were reasonably represented, forming approximately
one fifth of the delegates and assuming position of authority 192

Participation by common people:

. The Constitutional committee, National Assembly and the leadership council always met
in high security areas practically making it impossible for general public to participate.
The Constitutional Committee secretariat was to house an outreach unit for disseminating
. information regarding the constitution and receiving public feedback. Lack of office
space, delay in hiring staff led the unit only to release a 7 point questionnaire. Within the
limited time, they were able to receive 150,000 submissions, 20,000 of which came
Kurdish region and 10,000 from Sunnis of Falujah193. Even this limited outreach

WHRnet Resource, Retrieved from http://www. whrnet.org/fundamentalisms/docs/action-iraq-sitinn;---<..~."c,' Accessed on 29 th November, 2006
Afghanistan Report. P 25
USIP report 19
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activity had no effect in the drafting process as by April 13 the committee had a draft
version ready before the outreach committee prepared a report 194 •
Unlike the Iraqi situation, the Afghan Constitutional Commission had a public
education unit, which began to operate in May 2003. Regional offices helped
campaigning , on the significance of a constitution for Afghanistan, with an overview of
past constitutions, the on-going constitution making process, the importance of people's
views, and the impact on their lives,]95. This campaign is claimed to have reached all 32

provinces and refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan 196. Public consultation followed the
education phase during June and July '03 197 . The consultation was carried out through
meetings

where

possible

and

by

distributing

questionnaires

among

people.

Approximately 532 meetings were attended by as many as 150,000 Afghans whereas
80,000 to 100,000 questionnaires were received 198. After a final joint review by the
Review Commission and National Security Council consisting of select numbers of the
ministry of defense, foreign affairs, the interior and the justice; a draft constitution was
released on November 3rd , '03 for consideration by the Afghan people and Loya Jirga. On
the 22nd day of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, a Constitution was

194
195
196

adopted unanimously

Id
Id P 14
Id

197 Without any actual draft of the constitution how this consultation helped the process is doubtful. Under
criticism from media and public in general, the CC promised to explain how people's views were taken into
cl0nsideration but failed to do so. P 15
98

199

Id

A written version of the Constitution was signed and published on 26th of January '04.
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Referendum:
Enthusiasts described the referendum as, " ... a civilized step that puts Iraq on the path to
democracy, to rebuilding our new Iraq.200n Enthusiasm flew high as the Constitution got

approval from 79 % of Iraqi voters on October 15th . Voters in Sunni majority areas
overwhelmingly rejected the proposal whereas the Shiites and Kurds supported it
indicating signals of 'political polarization,201 in Iraq. Even though the United Nations
expressed concerns over the rules of referendum being changed without proper
representation in the Parliament, they did not find enough evidence to oppose the results.
The rules stipulated that simple majority 'yes' votes from registered voters would pass
the measure if two thirds of registered voters in at least three provinces would not vote
'no' 202

Conclusion:
After more than a year of the referendum adopting the Constitution, looking back at the
process and substance of the document is painful. Iraq is in civil war and more divided
than it ever appeared to be in history. Did it meet any of the criterions mentioned at the
beginning of this paper? The answer is no-it did not clarify the authority of state officials,

Independent Electoral Commission spokesman Farid Ayar at a new conference on October 25,2005;
retrieved from
h!tp://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=10000087&sid=amqz7dZlEx3w&refer=top world news on
12/12/06
201 "Results of the referendum have indicated the degree of political polarization in Iraq," the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq said in an e-mailed statement in which it also praised Iraqis for turning
out to vote. "This poses an ongoing challenge for all Iraqis and underscores the importance of an inclusive
national dialogue." Id
200

202 Article 4 of the 'Law on the Referendum on the Constitution' stipulated the rules for the referendum.
Later VOA news agency reported that an amendment was passed in the Parliament with only half of its
members present and how Kurdish and Shiites lawmakers tried to ensure the language to be 'registered
Voters' rather than 'total voters'. http://www.voanews.comlenglishlarchive/2005-1 0/2005-1 0-05~3.cfm?CFID=I1314358&CFTOKEN=71539737, retrieved on 12112/06
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failed to build focused claim on sovereignty and left most part of institution building to
the legislature.
The mostly criticized provision of the Constitution is probably its institution of
federalism. Unexplained, not properly defined claim of a federal government raises
questions about the unity of Iraq. The powers awarded to Kurdistan indirectly through
regional mask may very well lead to division of the country. As 'under the impetus of
globaiisation, migrations, rights consciousness, gender politics, powers of imitation, and
suffering, the question of diversity has forced itself on politicians and policy makers, and
the international community203, this Constitution does nothing to preserve the common

vision of a unified Iraq. Allowing regional power over natural resources revenues create
more chaos than it solves. Creation of an undefined federalism where many important
institutions are left to the creation of legislatures, power sharing between the central and
regional government that particularly benefits one segment of Iraqi society as well as lack
of common vision added to the sectarian violence that is a everyday reality in Iraq today.
Islam has been awarded an important place in Iraqi legal and social structure
through this Constitution. Depending on the interpretation of the legislative branch, it
may turn into another Middle Eastern country degrading women's position in the society.
The process of Constitution making for Iraq has not been an ideal one. The
COmmittee worked within a very short time, could not engage one of the largest segments
of Iraqi society and lacked proper representation from civil society including women's

203

Yash Ghai, 'A Journey around constitutions: Reflecting on Contemporary Constitutions', p 11 retrieved
from http://www.idea.intJconflictJcbp/uploadljourney.pdf on 2006/12/5
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groups. The undeniable US influence over the process had added a flavor almost
comparable to the colonial constitutions. 204
What could be done now? The notion of Constitutional review has emerged in
important forums. The issues that have been 'swept under the rug during the drafting
phase,205 must be dealt with now. Sharing power in terms of governance, revenue sharing
in oil and taxation are matters that must be reconsidered.
The Constitution building exercise in Iraq may serve as caution for any society
trying to rush into a magic framework that will provide post conflict solutions for a multi
ethnic country. As for the wronged, Constitutional review together with education of the
common people leading to their informed approval of it must be secured. Failure to
revisit the needs of Iraqi society and offer adequate framework for it will meet with
undesirable future for the region and the world at large.
Putting the criticisms aside, it must be noted that initiating the complex task of
constitution making in a country that was under authoritarian rule for longer than most of
its citizens have lived is an achievement in itself. The culture of participating in
government decision-making once introduced will mature and offer true democracy to its
citizens.

204 'The economic interest is overriding, although it finds little expression in the constitution-which is
deSigned to give maximum discretion to the legislature and the executive-', Ghai, N 76 p4
205 Kofi Annan, BBC interview 2006.12.06
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Chapter IV
Iraqi Women: The captives of Democracy
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Introduction:
"To disregard women and bar them from active participation in political, social,
economic and cultural life would in fact be tantamount to depriving the entire population
of every society of half its capability. The patriarchal culture and the discrimination
against women, particularly in the Islamic countries, cannot continue for ever,,206.
In most societies of the world, women are the most disadvantageous groups among
all. Poverty, famine, natural calamities as well as lack of development in legal and social

segments affect women more gravely than their male counterparts. In a peaceful
environment of a country, women are constantly struggling for their equal rights to state
resources and for adequate legal protection from violence and discrimination. In a
country caught between post conflict rebuilding and civil war situation, the challenges of
survival and empowerment for women are far greater. The fact of a temporary
government making important decisions regarding issues that will make significant
impact on Iraq's future policy towards women made the situation even more complex.
The story of Iraqi women is tragic if not horrifying. Under political repression and
international sanctions they have tried to thrive for decades; ironically it's democracy
that's threatening their potentials as human beings as well as survival. This chapter
purports to communicate the roles played by the transitional authority in dealing with the
"woman question" in Iraq. I look at issues that women in Iraq face today in the context of

-

Transitional authority including Survival in its very basic sense; legal status and
. protection; political participation in the reconstruction effort; and plight during the
206 Shirin Ebadi's Nobel peace prize acceptance speech, 2003, retrieved from
!mp:llnobelprize.orglnobel prizes/peacellaureates/2003/ebadi-Iecture-e.html on December 23, 2006.

89
II

conflict and justice afterwards etc. For a fruitful discussion, I take into account
constitutions of Iraq from different periods, acceptance of international legal standards,
reports from international and local non governmental organizations as well as personal
accounts of prominent scholars. Most of the secondary sources I refer to for this section
belong to the 'feminist jurisprudence' category. My preference to this particular. area of
scholarship stem from my own interest in feminism and it was only natural that I found
these writings more agreeable than others. This chapter is divided into three parts. First I
look at the situation of women existing prior to 2003 as found in the legal structures and
international texts. Then I investigate the current situation and changes both positive and
negative as brought about by the transitional authority taking into consideration
comparative analysis with the Afghan administration. Lastly I voice my concerns and put
forward recommendations referring to international legal standards.

Iraqi Women: Prior to 2003
Legal status: Women have played important roles in Iraqi society throughout history.
The interim Constitution of 1958, which was drafted after the Iraqi revolution of July
14th, 1958,207 awarded women equal status to men. The revolution changed the marriage,
inheritance and divorce laws along with many others and made them subject to the
jurisdiction of civil courts instead of Islamic family matters 208 . The early years of
Baathist socialism saw women's status and rights further enshrined in legal

1958 revolution
Dr. Shakir Hanish, The July 14th 1958 Revolution in Iraq, retrieved from
h!m.:/lwww.iraqcp.orgl003071 JshE.htm on December 29,2006 cross referenced from UNIFEM gender
profile.
207

208
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infrastructures. The Constitution of 1970 awarded women equality before the law

209

,

equal opportunities in the society21O, free education up to university levee 11 , right to
work212 , right to hold public offices 213 as well as right to maternal and child care through
the state

214

. As a result of these progressive steps, during Saddam Hussein's rule, "Iraqi

women were widely considered to be among the most educated and professional women
in the Arab world,,?15 According to reports of The Iraqi Bureau of Statistics in 1976,
women constituted approximately 38.5 percent of those in the education profession, 31
percent of the medical profession, 25 percent of lab technicians, 15 percent of
accountants and 15 percent of civil servants?16.

The situation of Iraqi women in the professional and state sectors, who had enjoyed the
highest literacy rate in the regIOn before 1991 changed dramatically after the UN
sanctions 217 came into operation. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to UN mandated
armed intervention in Iraq causing severe consequences for women in all parts of their
lives. Together with women's education and work opportunities suffered family lives
when number of widows increased significantly. According to a report by UNESCO, the
literacy rate among women plunged down to less than 25% in 2001 from a 87% in 1987.
209 Article 19 of 1970 Constitution; retrieved from http://www.iedciq.org/englishlpaper.php?source=akbar&mlf=interpage&sid=lO195 on December 28,2006
210
Id

Article 27, 1970 constitution
Article 32, 1970 constitution, a 1974 government decree further stipulated that all university graduates,
male and female will be employed automatically.

211

212

Article 30, 1970 constitution
Art·IC Ie 11, 197 0 constitutIOn
..
215 DNlFEM Gender Profile- Iraq, retrieved from http://www.womenwarpeace.org/iraq/iraq.htmon
December 28, 2006
~16 Rassam, "Political Ideology and Women in Iraq," p 87 cross posted from HRW report
17 In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq by Security
Council Resolution 661. SIRES/661(1990)
213
214
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Women's advantageous status under the Constitution suffered a set back when then
leader Saddam Hussein introduced anti women legislation for gaining support from the
conservative groups of Iraq. In 1990 such a presidential decrees granting immunity to
men guilty of committing honor crimes 218 claimed almost 4000 lives of women?19

Political Participation:
Since 1958 women in Iraq have regularly participated in state responsibilities though in
few numbers. There was a vibrant civil society including number of women's

°.

organizations prior to the secular Baath party's rule in 196822 Instead of allowing civil
society groups to thrive General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) was created and it
ran more than 200 urban and rural community centers throughout Iraq offering job
trainings, educational and other social programs 221 . Though different groups have argued
that the GFIW had been merely an arm of the oppressive Iraqi government and did not
represent the struggle of Iraqi women222 , the organization and its officers played a
significant role in implementing state policy and lobbying for changes in the legal
system. Iraqi women got the right to vote and run for office in 1980 even though they
continued to be ill represented in state offices. In the first parliamentary election women
Won 16 seats followed by 33 seats in the next election in a 250-member councit223 .

Honor killing is a practice prevalent in many societies of the world mostly among Muslim popUlation
where a person may be killed by a family member without legal implications where the victim is accused of
bringing shame to her family. Women are the primary prey for honor crimes but some men also fall victim
to this custom. According to United Nations Populations Fund, annually about 5000 women are murdered
by their relatives for 'Honor' around the world.
219 Unifem Gender Profile, Article 111 of Iraqi Penal Code granted immunity for honor crimes.
220 http://www.hrw.orglbackgrounder/wrdliraq-women.htm from UNIFEM Gender Profile
221 id
218

222
223

HRW report
UNlFEM Gender Profile
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Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Gulf war of 1991 and Saddam Hussein's growing dependence
on religious groups' support caused women to suffer severe setback in their lives during
1990s. Along with the return of Islamic personal laws, single sex education system
instead of co education women were encouraged to return to their traditional roles as
home keepers. Legislation was also introduced to restrict women's work outside their
homes and curtailing their right to mObility224. Politically women participated less than
before, only amounting to 8% of total members in the council in 2003 225 . They faced
arbitrary arrests or imprisonment regularly for belonging to opposition groups, refusing to
join or attend Baath Party meetings or simply for the purposes of intimidating male
family members.

Social Status:
"For women of low-income classes within urban areas or poor women living in the
countryside sheer survival has become the main aim of their lives. There is no doubt about the
IIIII

fact that it is particularly the poor mothers whose children are more likely to become yet
another statistic in the incredibly high child mortality rates or who suffer from disease and
malnutrition. Yet even for educated women who were part of the broad and well-off middleclasses of Iraq, feeding their children has become the major worry and focus,,226.

During the 90s Iraqi women did not only loose their previous educational and
professional positions but also faced basic survival challenges. To add to the misery of

224 HRW reported that women under the age of forty five were prohibited to leave Iraq without being
accompanied by a male relative.
225 UNIFEM Gender Profile
226 'women, gender relations and Sanctions in Iraq', Nadje AI-Ali retrieved from
http://www.acttogether.org!Womengender&sanctionsinlraq.htm on January 3, 2007
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growing divorce, domestic violence227 and polygamy rates, women were deprived from
any family planning methods leading to abandonment of unwanted children because of
lack of food. Prostitution grew both inside and in neighboring countries228 . Beheading of
women became a common phenomenon in the early 2000 primarily aiming to combat
prostitution229 . According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) by 2000 Iraqis comprised the second largest refugee groups after Afghans 230
with a significant number of women and children.

The Survival Strategy:

Iii'

Despite deteriorating economic, security and social conditions women tried to cope with
the new realities. Informal grassroots business, women's organizations particularly in the
Kurdistan flourished and worked towards improving living situations for women231 . The
exile women communities have been active throughout the Saddam regime in protesting
and letting the world know about the plight of women in Iraq.

227 Though since 1991 till the occupation, no fact finding mission had been allowed inside Iraq, UNICEF
cautioned that it was " .. probable that incidents of domestic violence have increased in conjundtion with
economic austerity" ; " Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Iraq" UNICEF, 1998 p 100.
228 In her Article Nadje Ali comments that legislation restricting women's movements without male
relatives came about after Jordan complained about increased rate of prostitution by Iraqi women in its
territory.
229 International Federation for Human Rights and Human Rights Alliance France, " Iraq: an intolerable,
forgotten and unpunished repression", 2000 p23 retrieved from
http://www.fidh.orglmagmoyenirapport/2002/iq315a.pdfonJanuary42007.This report estimated the
number of beheaded women in the period of June 2000-Apri12001 as between 60 to 2000. Though the
punishment was aimed at prostitutes, beheading had been used to repress any hint of opposion to the
government.
230 FIDH report, p 5. The report also mentioned the number of refugees being 580,000 in Iran, between
120,000-300,000 in Jordan, 27000 in Syria, between 5000-7000 in Saudi Arabia, more than 2500 in
Lebanon and 1500 in Pakistan. 300,000 Christians are also believed to be expatriate and the number of
internally displaced people is approximately a million.
231 For example, in semi-autonomous Kurdistan about 400 learning centers were established for adolescent
girls, conferences were organized calling for more participation from women at all levels of society and
shelters were established for violence victims with the help of women organizations.
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In the Occupied Territories
It is unpleasant truth that with the occupation of Iraq, which is being largely justified on

the arguments of gross human right violations, rape rooms and ill treatment of women by
the Saddam government, Iraqi women have remained the same and deteriorated from
their previous positions in many segments of society. Beginning from the CPA rule
continuing till the elected government, women's rights were sacrificed in favor of gaining
political support in the eyes of the powerful religious groups. The opportunity to create
an exemplary democracy with equal participation from women in the Middle East has
been traded off over popularity gain with the religious conservatives.

As Birgitte Sorensen suggests, "Women's main concerns in relation to post-war

reconstruction can be summarized in the following two questions: Will the emerging
political system recognize and protect women's rights and interests? And will women be
enabled to influence and participate in the political process ?,,232 I look at each of the
transitional authority in Iraq to paint a picture of neglecting and in many cases
overlooking the issue of women in Iraqi society.

CPA:

DUring the CPA administration, the first constitutional document to govern occupied Iraq
was drafted. The 24 member constitutional committee appointed by the occupyirig forces
was responsible for drafting the interim constitution and the task did not involve any

Birgitte Sorensen, Women and post conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Resources, WSP Occasional
Paper No 3, 1998 P 13
232
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women member. The affirmation of the Preamble thus falls short of its promise233 • The
document uses improper terms to describe unity of Iraqi people234 , makes religious tenets
superior to law

235

,

and fails to recognize legal and social discrimination against women

among the vestiges of the fallen regime.

236

Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the

document for women in Iraq was to condition equality of women before law 237 subject to
Islamic interpretation by mentioning Islam as a source of legislation and the superior
authority over enacted rules during the transitional period. These provisions had far
reaching effect beyond the CPA and in the permanent constitution; many of these
discriminatory features were reproduced. Though the CPA appointed Iraqi Governing
Councie38 , a 25 member provisional government, was largely accountable to the CPA
they managed to pass a Directive that transformed the family law according to Islamic
provisions. Despite conflicting reports from Human rights groups, the CPA claimed
The TAL preamble affirms Iraq's respect for international law which entails upo~ a state responsibility
to engage its women in political processes along with many other rights. For example, Fourth World
Conference on Women 1995 recommended measures for countries to take to enhance women's
participation in politics and decision making through the Beijing Platform for Action. The 1979 Convention
on the Elimination of all sorts of Discrimination Against Women, of which Iraq is a state party requires
states to eliminate discrimination in women's political participation through legal and special measures
(Article 2-Article 4), take all necessary measures to eliminate discrimination in all segments of public life
(Article 7).
234 Preamble states " ... have endeavored at the same time to preserve the unity of their homeland in a spirit
of fraternity and solidarity in order to draw the features of the future new Iraq, ... "
235 Article 3 of TAL states, " .. no amendment may be made that could abridge in any way the rights of the
Iraqi people cited in Chapter Two; extend the transitional period beyond the timeframe cited in this Law;
delay the holding of elections to a new assembly; reduce the powers of the regions or governorates; or
affect Islam, or any other religions or sects and their rites."
236 The Iraqi Transitional Government shall take effective steps to end the vestiges of the oppressive acts of
the previous regime arising from forced displacement, deprivation of citizenship, expropriation of financial
assets and property, and dismissal from government employment for political, racial, or sectarian reasons.
237 Article 7 A states, "Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source of
legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or
the rights cited in Chapter Two of this Law may be enacted during the transitional period" defeating the
promise in Article 12 that reads, "All Iraqis are equal in their rights without regard to gender, sect, opinion,
belief, nationality, religion, or origin, and they are equal before the law. Discrimination against an Iraqi
citizen on the basis of his gender, nationality, religion, or origin is prohibited. Everyone has the right to
life, liberty, and the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his life or liberty, except in
accordance with legal procedures. All are equal before the courts."
.
238 The CPA established a Governing Council for Iraq through regulation 6 of 13 July 2003. Available
@ http://www .iraqcoalition.org/regulations/index.html#Regulations
233
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victory over women's empowerment239 . Appointing three women members in the
Governing Council was publicized widely before one of them was killed in a deadly
attack240 .

As the occupying power the CPA was under an obligation to restore and maintain
public order and safety as well as respect the fundamental rights of the territory's
inhabitants241 . Protecting women "against any attack on their honour, in particular

against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault,,242 or introducing
necessary amendments to the Penal code243 were also sectors that the CPA failed to
implement for the betterment of women's rights. Throughout the duration of the CPA
administration, controversial penal structure that allowed reduced punishments for honor
crimes or allow male perpetrators of severe sexual crimes to escape punishment by
marrying their victims remained in force 244 exposing the failure of the administration's
obligation to ensure basic human rights for women and girls.

For example see "Climate of Fear: Sexual violence and abduction of women and girls in Baghdad"
Human Rights Watch Report July 2003 Vol. 15, no 7 (E) retrieved from
!illp:llhrw.org/reports/2003/iraq0703/; "Iraq: Decades of suffering, now women deserve better" retrieved
from
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/iraq/document.do ?id=9E865CC4FD535B2880256F73005E4047 on
Feb 1 2007 and CPA official document "CPA accomplishments 2003-2004" retrieved at
!illp://www.iragcoalition.org/pressreleases/20040628 histcn-ic review cpa.doc pages 51-55
240
UNlFEM Report. Page 4
241 See Article 43 of Hague convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of war on Land and Article
29 and 47 of Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949.
242 Article 27 of the Geneva Convention in Time of war retrieved from the website of the Office of the High
Commissioner of Human Rights @ http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu3/b/92.htm on Feb 1 2007
243 Article 67 of the same
244
HRW Report '03 n 34 p 19
239
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Iraq Interim Government:

A 37 member Interim Government took over Iraq's governance on June 30th when the
CPA dissolved. The members, chosen through consultation among the CPA, IGC, United
Nations and Iraqi people consisted of politicians, former IGC members, tribal leaders,
exiles out of whom six were women. The TAL was the constitutional framework for this
government, which was recognized as the sovereign authority for Iraq by the United
Nations, Arab league, United States and several other countries. Interestingly the armed
troops of the coalition did not leave raising speculations of a de facto control by the
occupying forces. The Interim government did not take any specific measure to ensure
safety and empowerment of women; neither did it overrule any discriminatory provision
of the existing framework.

Iraq Transitional Government:

An elected Transitional government took power in Iraq on 3cd of May 2005 serving till
20th May of 2006 only to transfer sovereignty of Iraq to a permanent structure of
governance. This government operated according to the TAL and was entrusted with the
responsibility of drafting a permanent constitution for new Iraq. The Constitutional
drafting committee had six women members and the government itself did not have
significant participation from women. The Constitution made women's rights subject to
religious consent and rather than addressing previous regimes' discriminatory regulations
encouraged Islamic ideology to decide on women's position in society. Iraqi women
suffered a serious set back at the beginning of a new era; where even an autocratic
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government could not undermine women's role

III

the society a democratic process

stripped away potentials from them.

All three bodies of the transitional authority failed to address the most important issues
regarding women; political participation, education, health concerns, security needs to
name a few. Despite calls from women's organizations within Iraq, exile Iraqis and
international organizations women did not have any important role to play in the political
process from the very beginning245. Women considered being the highest ranking in
terms of empowerment within the Arab world suffered during the sanctions and remained
significantly neglected in the rebuilding of a society. The De' Baathification requirement
for the candidates for government positions and other civil affiliations may have played a
negative role in women's participation in politics and other social advancement
programs. Under the previous government, women's organizations operated as Baath
party wings in various parts of the country to provide education and trainings to

For example, in a report by Refugees International titled" Iraq: Focus on Women's needs" published in
April '03 it is-mentioned that at the first post Saddam political meeting in Nasiriya only 4 exile women took
part in a group of 123 attendees. The trend continued throughout other gatherings where future of Iraqi
politics was being discussed. For more on this see http://www.interaction.org/newswire/detail.php?id=1570

245

For example, 'General Federation of Iraqi women' was the most active women's organization with 1.5
million members during Saddam and operated under Baath Party. see
http://www .interaction.org/newswire/detail. php ?id= 1570

246
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Recommendations

1 Defining Peace for Women: What constitutes peace for women? Is it absence of
war by foreign invaders or internal rivalry? In answering this, Donna Ramsey
points finger at the right answer" The definition of peace as 'not war' ignores the
high levels of domestic and societal violence suffered by women even in times not
characterized by violent political conjlict or in the period immediately following a
conjlict,,247. In Iraqi situation women are facing the aftermath of a deadly conflict

both at horne and outside. Rapes, domestic violence, religious prejudice,
unemployment and above all lack of security at every step have dominated Iraqi
women's lives since the occupation claimed victory over previous repressive
regime. Mere military presence may help reduce sectarian violence or civil war
whatever we call it, but true peace for women will prevail when both the legal and
social structure supporting equality will complement secure lives that can reach
full potential.
2 Political Participation: As discussed before women's voices must be heard in
decision-making processes for a society to advance in the direction of gender
equality. In order to achieve adequate participation from women in the political
arena, countries have adopted different measures in post conflict situations. For
example during post conflict rebuilding South Africa, Mozambique and Namibia

Donna Ramsey Marshall, 'Women in war and peace: Grassroots peace building' USIP Peace works no
24 August 2004 p 8
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sought quota system whereas Timor-Leste concentrated on training women to
participate effectively in official positions248 . Women in the Muslim societies
have been less involved in politics because of the social stigma and lack of
education. The picture outside the'Arab states may be different but today's Iraq is
necessarily carrying the primary identity of an Islamic state where women have to
deal with the realities of discrimination in many respects. The Afghanistan
scenario may look awfully familiar to today's Iraq where the only female
presidential candidate was prevented from delivering speeches at religious
shrines249 . Yet the rich culture of previous secular Iraq maybe revived through
education and institutions for preparing Iraqi women to participate in
governmental decision-making process. Even the liberal interpretation of Islamic
rules as described by the Iraqi government in 2000 as part of the CEDAW
implementation report may play a positive role regarding women's role in
politics250 . In trying to move forward with this agenda the US influence may
prove to be detrimental to the goal. US is one of the few countries in the world
that has not ratified the CEDAW 251 , does not support the affirmative action steps
towards women's empowerment which is a salient feature of the treaty and has
only 14% congressional representation of women in its national parliament252 •
Informed policy making, consultation with international, regional and local

Marcia E Greenberg and Elaine Zuckerman, " The Gender Dimensions of Post Conflict
Reconstructions: The challenges in Development Aid" WIDER Research Paper No 2006/62 p3.
249 Masouda Jalal was the only female candidate and could not run a fruitful campaign because of the
prejudices against her as a Muslim woman. For a general discussion on this, see Hilary Charlesworth, ' The
missing voice: women and the war in Iraq' 7 Oregon Review ofInternational Law 14 2005.
250 Reference to the CEDAW UN document: Islam awards equal rights to women in relation to education,
divorce and political participation.
25\ Which other countries are not parties to the CEDAW convention?
252 Hilary p 14
248
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interested bodies before taking actions and respecting relevant international
documents may improve the situation for women in Iraq as well as the country to
find stability in the post conflict scenari0253 •

3

Reviewing the Constitution: As the most important framework and Supreme law
for a country, the Constitution dominates the legal system. The 2005 Constitution
of Iraq guarantees women equality and numerous rights subject to Islamic law.
Islamic law clearly discriminates against women in relation to family matters such
as inheritance, marriage and divorce etc. Depending on the interpreting authority
it may mean restricting women's access to judicial or leadership positions
stretched into limiting simple everyday things like driving or traveling without
male companions 254 . Despite promises made in the Bonn agreement in 2001 and
equal rights subject to Islamic beliefs enshrined in the Constitution, Afghan
women saw little improvement of their situation since the Taliban regime255 .The
Constitution must be reviewed and given a secular outlook rather than making it a
compromise document with the religious groups. Reviewing the Constitution and
making necessary amendments will open the door to abolish discrimination in the
existing legaLsystem. Unfortunately many laws denying women's equal status in
the Iraqi society has gone unnoticed during the Transitional administrations. It is
necessary to revisit the legal system and address the issues of honor killings,

253 Rwanda took effective steps to involve its women, 60% of total population after the ethnic cleansing,
that resulted in 49% representation in its national parliament in 2003 making it the largest female
representation in Parliament worldwide. N 43 Greenberg and Zuckerman.
254 For example, Most of the Middle Eastern countries do not allow women to be judges or rulers as well as
banning them from exercising voting rights, traveling or driving on their own.
255 Hilary P 14
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inheritance, marriage and divorce rights, traveling in and outside the country and
many more provisions that are archaic on the face of them. Introducing new laws
to benefit the underprivileged and distressed women may be another option to

4

Taking women's experience in account: People experience events within the
purview of their race, class, gender etc. Women's sufferings in times of war are
not limited to physical or emotional abuse, many times they are forced to take
over household responsibilities in the absence of male members without ever
being exposed to such duties before. During post conflict nation building
measures, women's experience in war must be given due attention to prescribe
reconstruction effort. In most cases women's different experiences of war are not
taken into account in drafting peace agreements, post conflict reconstruction
efforts, humanitarian aid distribution or even in the day-to-day governance
scenario 257 • Just as women constitute a significant number in Iraqi society today,
their voices and accounts must be given serious consideration in dealing with any
issue in the post conflict society.

5 Adopting UN mandated standards: Iraq had been a signatory of numerous
international human rights treaties for decades 258 that ensure women's human

Followed by post conflict legal review, countries like Eritrea, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa and
Uganda sought amendments to property rights whereas Chinese and Vietnamese governments introduced
new laws banning employment discrimination based on gender. Greenberg and Zuckerman p 4-5
257
.Donnap 8
258 Iraq is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR), International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), International Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC) , International Convention against Torture (CAT), International Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (lCERD), International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of all Migrant workers and members of their families( ICPRMW) etc.
256
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rights in the most basic sense. Iraq has also ratified CEDAW259 , known as the bill
of rights for women with reservations to granting women equal rights in personal
aspects like marriage, divorce, spousal rights, nationality and all sectors regulated
by religious law and to submitting to compulsory jurisdiction of the international
court of justice (ICJ) in case of dispute. Though 185 UN member countries have
signed the treaty, the highest number of reservations of all treaties makes it look
almost like an excuse to get away with the agenda of equality of women. The
treaty itself declares it impermissible to have reservations incompatible to the
object and purpose of the treaty but merely puts the burden on states to challenge
each other on this rather than declaring ratification with reservations void 26o • Iraq
maintains reservations to provisions that go to the heart of the convention and yet
by declaring reservations to mandatory jurisdiction of the ICJ they escape the
questioning of any state party. It is not surprising that during the CPA, Iraqi
Governing Councilor even the Iraq Interim Government questions of
withdrawing reservations did not come up since the leading force of the coalition,
the USA never ratified the treaty after signing it in 1980. Unfortunately during the
elected transitional authority the issue became more distant than ever because of
the rise of religious power in the government. Now it is very unlikely that
discrimination suffered by women with the excuse of Islam will be removed from
Iraqi society soon.

259 Iraq became a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) on 13 th August 1986 with reservations to Article 2(f, g), Article 9 (Para 1&2), Article
16 and Article 29 (Para 1).
260 Article 28 Para 2 of CEDAW adopts the impermissibility principle of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of the Treaties but leave them on state parties to challenge before the ICI. Reservation on mandatory
jurisdiction of the ICI makes the mechanism cripple.
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Both the occupying powers and transitional administrations failed to confirm
to the standards of SC resolution 1325. Inclusion of women in decision making
process for preventing, managing and resolving conflict261 ; voluntary financial,
technical and logistical support for gender sensitive training efforts 262 , respect
international humanitarian laws in times of conflict263 , adopt measures to end
impunity and seek justice for genocide, war crimes including sexual violence against
women and children264 -almost all of the binding provisions of the UN resolution
have been ignored by the authorities. The transitional authorities also missed the
opportunity to sign the statute of International Criminal Court (ICC), a gender
sensitive human rights instrument that can answer some women's grievances during
armed conflict. As has been mentioned " while other human rights instruments have
mechanisms to deal only with violations by states, the ICC represents new
possibilities for the international enforcement of human rights as it has the
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals directly,,265, the ICC might have addressed

sexual violence against women by the coalition forces or various ethnic groups. To
right the wrongs of the transitional administrators Iraq's elected government may still
become a state party to the treaty and recognize the need for protecting women's
human rights at its best.

SC Res. 1325 Para 1
SC Res. 1325 Para 7
263 SC Res. 1325 Para 9
264 SC Res. 1325 Para 11
265 Zakia Afrin and Amy Schwartz, " A human rights instrument that works for women: ICC as a tool for
gender justice" in Wilson, Sengupta and Evans edited "Defending our dreams: global feminist voices for a
new generation" p 155
261

262
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p
Conclusion
A world that was convinced of "Women's empowerment and their full

participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in
the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement
of equality, development and peace,,266 stood by as Iraqi society traveled backwards and
adopted primitive measures for the women. The civil war, western domination and
regional power dynamics have dominated the discussion of Iraq since the transitional
administration handed over power to an elected government. The damaging policies of
the interim governments have exited the discussion table and apart from few insistent
human rights groups, Iraqi women's plight are not considered as important issue any
more.
From the beginning of this conflict, women were excluded as decision makers
both in the coalition forces and Iraq. The only woman leader consulted during the
coalition forming was Megowati Sukarnoputri and she was discredited as 'unreliable and
erratic' because of her doubts about participating267 • Referring to the coalition forces as
"boys only club" Professor Charlesworth finds deep connection among all the "war
mangers" including the US and Iraq as they exclude women from foreign policy
. making 268 . This under representation of women in deciding to launch an armed attack and
misrepresentation by the media throughout the conflict where Iraqi women were depicted

Para 13 of Beijing Declaration on Fourth World Conference on Women, "Action for Equality,
Development and Peace" held on Beijing China September, 1995 retrieved from
http://www.un.org!womenwat\,hldawlbeijinglbeijingdeclaration.html on February 6, 2007.
267 Hilary Charlesworth, "The Missing Voice: Women and the War in Iraq" 7 Oregon .Review of
international Law 2005 p 9
268
Id
266
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as victims of Saddam Hussein's oppressive regime followed by the silence about
grievances during the transitional authority. As civil war escalates in Iraq, women
disappear from the focus of the international community as they do from the streets of a
free country. During the Saddam regime, they were persecuted solely based on political
beliefs while awarded the right to education, work and a secular environment; in the
democratic Iraq, they have been reduced to bear identity of Muslim women first before
everything else. Is democracy worth it? Where is the accountability of the transitional
governments who proactively chose the mechanisms that's minimizing the potentials of
Iraqi women?
We can only hope that the elected government will confmn to international
standards regarding women's rights and a future without discrimination will emerge from
within Iraq.
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Chapter V
Post conflict Justice
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Introduction:
It was just like another video from the extremists showing beheading of human

beings lives on camera. Or it may have been a replica of the episode of Roman Empire
when crowds enjoyed people being eaten alive by beasts in the coliseum. Instead the
hanging of Saddam Hussein was an act of a special tribunal and elected government. On
6 am Iraqi time December 30 2006, when Muslims in many parts of the world were
celebrating the most important holiday of their faith Eid ul FItr269 , The Iraqi President
was humiliated in front of the world and hanged. For many, this is the picture of post
conflict justice in Iraq. I beg to defer. The final moments of Saddam Hussein are in no
way representative of an otherwise impressive effort.
In the endeavor to create democracy based on the notion of 'Rule of Law',
perhaps the most daunting task of the transitional authority in Iraq had been the one of
administering justice. The traditional definition of justice as discussed by Plato270 can be
stretched in the setting of a post conflict situation. Paul Van Zyl, the executive secretary
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa solicits a very broad
definition of justice as moving
" ... beyond focusing purely on the conduct of perpetrators, to include the needs of
victims and the imperative to reform state institutions to ensure that human rights abuses
does not recur,,271.

Popularly known as Eid, this is the most significant Muslim festival that is celebrated once a year after a
month long fast known as Ramadan.
270 In his 'The Republic' Plato discusses the notion of justice through conversation between Socrates and
his interlocutors. Plato's own arguments may be summarized to mean justice as the task of society
according to one's natural abilities.
271 For Paul van zyl's analysis 0 f the Velasquez Rodriguez judgment at 4 Iner-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser.C) 1988
defining justice see Unfinished Business: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Contribution to
Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa in Bassiouni edited Post-Conflict Justice p 745-746
269
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This definition can be meant to understand two aspects of justice,
a. Retributive and restorative justice leading to peaceful future. 272
b. Repairing and enhancing the judicial system.
In a post conflict situation, the second approach is usually given less attention 273 . And

the first aspect is criticized by many scholars as part of the ongoing debate that evolves
around the notion whether seeking justice in a post conflict situation is impediment to
peace!274In case of Iraq, however, the expectation of retributive justice was undisputed
among the population. At the same time, the role of occupiers required compliance with
international obligation to restore law and order, which translated into restoring and
enhancing the judicial system. Thus in the post conflict situation in Iraq, justice
necessarily meant holding Saddam's government liable for their atrocities against Iraqi
citizens over the period of 35 years and reconstructing the judicial system while
introducing the aspect of independence of jUdiciary.

In this chapter I analyze the TA's approach to post conflict justice in Iraq and their

initiatives. Describing the actions of the authority I advance to answer three questions;
first, did the statute of the special tribunal meet international standards? Second, did the
trial of Saddam Hussein serve to satisfy goals post conflict justice? Third, did· the T A

272 Retributive justice seeks to inflict punishment on the offenders for violations of law whereas restorative
justice puts major emphasis on the harm committed to human relationships and aims to achieving social
harmony in the aftermath of a corrtlict. Restorative justice may include Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions.
273 As Cherif Bassiouni observed, " major western powers find it more polittcally congruent to their
interests to establish ad-hoc post-conflict justice systems which are essentially focused on the past and
without much regard for justice capacity building of national systems" p xvii, Cherif Bassiouni edited PostConflict Justice, Introduction, Transnational Publishers Inc. Ardsley, New York 2002
274 For a detailed description see Neil J Kritz, Progress and Humility: The ongoing Search for Post-Conflict
Justice in Bassiouni edited Post-Conflict justice 2002.
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actions for reconstructing the justice system comply with its mandate under international
law?

Establishing the special Tribunal for prosecuting Saddam

"In the short span of ten years between 1992 and 2002, the values of
international criminal justice have taken hold as an essential component of the
international legal order,,275
Truly the world has come a long way from the days of Nuremberg trial 276 , the first
international criminal tribunal of its kind, which was criticized for its partiality and
attitudes towards the victors. The establishment of ICTY 277 and ICTR278 in the 1990s not
only supported criminal liability for atrocities committed towards citizens by their own
governments but also integrated the rules of fair trials, rights of the accused,
compensation for the victims and many other progressive features in international legal
order279 . The ICC treaty280, however, elevated international criminal law to a new high
standard when it came into existence in 2002. Quoted as the first gender sensitive
legislation in international law, the ICC has strengthened the concept of international

CherifBassiouni edited Post-Conflict Justice, Introduction p xvi, Transnational Publishers Inc. Ardsley,
New York 2002
276 Nuremberg Trial
277 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the UN
through SC Res. 827 on May 25 1991 to prosecute the perpetrators ofthe Yugoslav war in 1991. For more
information on the Court see http://www.un.org/icty/
278 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by the UN through SC Res.955 of
November 8, 1994 to prosecute the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. For more information
on the Court, see http://69.94.11.53/
279For example, Both the ICTY and ICTR provide broad definitions of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, rape and other sexual assaults.
280 The international Criminal Court, a permanent tribunal to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes and crimes of aggression was created by an international treaty in 2002 . Independent of the
UN, the current member of this court is 104. For more information on the Court see http://www.icc-cpi.intl
275
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responsibility for domestic affairs of governments. The trend continues today with
several tribunals set up to address post conflict justice issues281

•

In this backdrop, it was only natural that Iraq's fallen government had to face

special tribunal kind justice for the killings of its' own citizens. The first issue before the
transitional authority was to choose the right forum for it. Among the choices were an
ICTY type international tribunal, an East Timor type combination of national and
international tribunal and an Iraqi tribunal created solely for the purposes of trying
international crimes without any international influence.

Despite expectations of an international criminal tribunal from the NGO
communities, the Transitional authority favored an Iraqi tribunae82 • The US
administration reportedly preferred the local institution for the Iraqi people to feel more
in charge of the events. Besides, anything less than the death penalty for Saddam might
not have been acceptable to the people and yet impossible under international
standards. 283 Tom Parker, the Head of CPA's crimes against humanity unit noted that
after verifying the interest level for different types of tribunals, idea of a national tribunal
was preferred by the authorities 284 • He also argued that after a brutal- sanctions regime,

281 Consider the case of Sierra Leone. After a ten year long bloody civil war the government of Sierra
Leone in agreement with the UN SC Res. 1315 of 2000 set up the Special Court for Sierra Leone that
combined both international and domestic legal traditions to prosecute serious violation of international
humanitarian law. See http://www.sc-sl.org/.
282 See Bassiouni CherifM, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: An appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal in 38
Cornell Int'l L. 1. 328-368 (2005) for a detailed discussion on the process of choosing to establish an Iraqi
tribunal as observed by the author in the capacity of director of International Human Rights Law Institute's
reconstruction of legal education program funded by the USAID in Iraq.
283 Id P 344
284 According to Tom Parker, as early as April 2003, OHRTJ began to reach out to Iraqi legal community
and local human rights groups. By August 2003 report titled 'Iraqi Voices' from International Centre for
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there was little interest on any UN involvement among the people. He failed to answer,
however, why a court set up with the blessings of an occupier will be more acceptable
than a recognized world institution.

The proposal for the tribunal initiated from CPA allies and the Governing
Council. The Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) that carried out the infamous trial of Saddam
Hussein first came into existence as the Iraqi Special Tribunal (1ST) in December 10,
2003. The CPA authorized the statute of 1ST promulgated by the Governing Council to
'to try Iraqi nationals or residents of Iraq accused of genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes or violations of certain Iraqi law' 285. Before being revoked and replaced by
the national assembly of the Transitional Government with IHT in August 2005, the 1ST
was set to utilize a combination of international and domestic criminal laws. The added
emphasis on Iraqi domestic law is the main difference between the two.

The IHT has jurisdiction over Iraqi citizens and residents accused of genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity between July 1968 and May 2003 as defined by
the ICC treaty286. The IHT also declares jurisdiction over various crimes punishable
under Iraqi criminal law 287 . The inclusion of offences mentioned in the 1958 Iraqi penal
code, which lack transparent definitions, raised concerns of being abused for political

Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and Human Rights Centre (HRC) @ UC Berkeley, claimed overwhelmed
support for a national tribunal to try Saddam. For a detailed discussion see Tom Parker, Prosecuting
Saddam: The CPA and the Evolution ofthe Iraqi Special Tribunal @ 38 Cornell Int'l. L. J. 2005
285 CPA Order 48
286 Article 1, 11, 12 and 13 of the IHT
287 Article 14 of the IHT
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purposes

288

. The trial is to be regulated by the Iraqi criminal procedure, which derived its

roots from civil legal traditions. According to the rules, an investigative judge collects all
evidence, witness testimonies to use in the trial proceedings 289 .

There are five judges in the trial chamber who decide on the appearances of the
witnesses and questions they answer290. After being presented with the documents
collected by the investigative judge, witness testimonies and prosecution and defense
arguments trial judges deliver a verdict and a written opinion on the case. The verdict
may be appealed before the Appeals chamber of the lliT that consist of nine judges
including a President of the Tribunae91 . According to the statute judges, prosecutors,
principle defense lawyer of the accused and all staff members of the SICT must be Iraqi
nationals 292 . Non-Iraqi international law experts may be appointed in advisory role to
assist judges and prosecutors in matters of international legal issues 293

The lliT grants impressive set of rights to the accused including equality before
the law, presumption of innocence until proven guilty and a fair trial. Armed with
international criminal law elements and promise of a fair trial, the lliT must be hailed as
an exemplary domestic institution to try war crimes and like of government entities. The
Saddam trial generated a lot of interest among international legal experts who waited
keenly to witness the advancement of international criminal law in a domestic forum.
In its October 16, 2005 briefing paper on The Former Iraqi Government on trial Human Rights Watch
mentions crimes mentioned in Article 14 as 'political offenses and of a breadth and vagueness that makes
them susceptible to politicized interpretation and application'
289 Iraqi code of Criminal Procedure, Para 51-129 cross posted from HRW paper n 19
290 Article 4.1 of IHT
291 Article 4.2 of IHT
292 Article 28, Article 22.4 of IHT
293 Article 9.2, Article 10.9, Article 11.7 of IHT
288
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Trial of Saddam Hussein

Saddam Hussein's government was infamous for systematic killing of political
dissidents. It is estimated that between 1968 and 2003, Iraqi government was responsible
for the disappearances of 500,000 Iraqis 294 .
The first case in front of the tribunal was Dujali case, where Saddam and other
members of his regime were accused of killing 148 Shias in Dujali in 1982. Among the
much-criticized Saddam trial were its legitimacy, fair trial, and capital punishment and
execution issues.
The legitimacy of the previous 1ST was harshly criticized by Bassiouni, a leading
expert in the field on international criminal law. Mentioning the CPA's illegal invasion of
Iraq he quoted

No nonns or precedents exist in international law for an occupying power, the
legitimacy of which is in doubt, to establish an exceptional national criminal tribunaz2 95•

He predicted that as soon as the tribunal is repromulgated by a national legislative
authority the legitimacy problem might be solved. It can be argued that the IHT is indeed
promulgated by the elected national assembly, thus perfectly legitimate in the legal sense.
This seems to be problematic as the election of the national assembly was administered
during a iJeriod dominated by the CPA and the occupation. During its Appellate Chamber
opinion, the IHT tried to answer the question of legitimacy as put forth by the accused by
Bassiouni, Cornell p 330
M CherifBassiouni, Post Conflict Justice in Iraq: An appraisal of the Iraqi Special Tribunal 38 Cornell
Int'l. LJ 359 (2005)
294
295
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pointing out that this court existed as a step taken by the elected government whom 78%
of Iraqi population supported in the election296 . Yet, the tribunal as one of the initiatives
of the transitional government is most likely to always have the legitimacy stigma with it.

Apart from the execution of the death penalty, it was criticized from two different
aspects. First, the retention of death penalty contradicting a well-established rule of
international law is questionable. It has been mentioned that despite CPA's dissatisfaction
with the move, the Governing Council and later on the Interim administration insisted on
retaining the capital punishment consistent with the existing penal code of 1969 in Iraq.
Tom parker also argued the decision as a prerogative of the sovereign. Though it is
tempting to believe in the superiority of the sovereign, this argument can not be given
weight as it would justify all the human rights advocated by international law states avoid
in the name of soverei gnty297.

Second, according to a view the death penalty was carried out in violation of the
Iraqi code of criminal procedure, which allows additional 30 days to the convicted after
the first appeal to request to correct errors in the judgment298 . In a rebuttal, Professor
Scharf pointed out that provision of the tribunal requiring execution within 30 days of the

Appellate Chamber Opinion ofIHT, December 26 2006
For example states do not ratify ICCPR, CEDAWetc.
298 Professor Kevin Jon Heller argues that according to Paragraph 266 of the Iraqi Code of Criminal
Procedure "the convicted person ... may request the correction of a legal errorin the decision issued by the
Court of Cassation, provided the request is submitted within 30 days, counted from the date a convicted,
imprisoned or detained person is notified of the Court of Cassation decision" which means after the
Appeals Chamber rejected Saddam's plea, he had another thirty days to ask the court to correct its legal
errors. As Rule 66 of the IHT Rules of Evidence and Procedure explicitly requires the judgment to be in
accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, executing Saddam before the lapse of thirty days violated
the IHT procedure. For more on his argument see Grotian Moment Blog , Dujali Issue #46 @
http://law .case.edu/saddamtrial/
296
297
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Appeals chamber decision prevailed over any domestic law as it was a special court
independent of the domestic court system299 .

Another criticism of the court draws on the sovereignty issue again. The visible
involvement of the CPA authorities and US officials afterwards met with the argument
that the tribunal could not act without their influence. Bassiouni argues that the visible
role of the US was due to the fact that experts from US DO], who went in March 2004 to
gather evidence to be used in the trial and to train the judges and prosecutors of the
tribunal, did not have adequate knowledge of Iraqi legal system let alone the legal culture
of the region 30o. Whatever the reason may have been, the US involvement continued till
the end of the trial damaging the notion of independence of the court.

Besides few international legal experts, Human rights organizations kept a close
watch on the Dujali trial. Fierce critic of the invasion of Iraq, these entities have sought
greater UN role in prosecuting Saddam Hussein or at least a court independent of US
influence30I . Human Rights Watch reported that the US neither follow a transparent
process of consulting Iraqis nor assess Iraqi attitudes about justice and accountability302.
Multiple requests from HRW and other human rights organization to comment on the
draft were turned down. In a report titled 'Iraq: Dujali Trial Fundamentally Flawed'

Professor Michael P. Scharf further mentioned, "This was an important approach as the IHT Statute was
written to import the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and there
were many provisions of the Iraqi Criminal Procedural Law of 1971 that were not consistent with those
rights. The drafters thus intended the provisions ofthe IHT Statute to control." See Grotian Moment Blog ,
Dujali Issue #46 @ http:inaw.case.eduisaddamtriaV
300 Bassiouni p 346
301 Two of the most influential NGO's worldwide Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW)
302 The Former Iraqi Government on Trial, A Human Rights Watch briefing paper, October 16,2005
retrieved from http://hrw.orglbackgrounder/mena/iraq1005/ (Last visited April 16, 2007)
299
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released on November 20 2006, It also argued that the trial had enough serious
procedural and administrative flaws to render it unfair and requested overturning of the
verdict303
Calling the trial deeply 'flawed and unfair' Amnesty International's Middle East and
North Africa Director quoted

"[Saddam Hussein's] overthrow opened the opportunity to restore the basic right [to a
fair trial] and, at the same time, to ensure, fairly, accountability for the crimes of the
past. It is an opportunity missed and made worse by the imposition of the death
penalty ,,304
Amnesty also voiced concerns about Saddam Hussein being denied right to
defense attorney for the first year of the trial, assassination of three defense lawyers in the
process, resignation of a judge on ground of partiality of the proceedings and overall
political interference of the US with the whole process. 305
The IHT promises fair trial for the accused. As a state party to the ICCPR, the
notion of fair trial entails a handful of rights to Iraqis including right to an impartial
tribunal and adequate time for the preparation of defense 306 . Media around the world has
reported throughout the trial about the killings of defense lawyers, boycott of the trial by
them and open proclamations of the judges about the guilt of the accused well before the
In the 97 page report, HRW reports procedural flaws in the trial including:
• Regular failure to disclose key evidence, including exculpatory evidence, to the defense in
advance
•
Violations of the defendants' basic fair trial right to confront witnesses against them
• Lapses of judicial denreanor that undermined the apparent impartiality of the presiding judge; and
•
Important gaps in evidence that undermine the persuasiveness of the prosecution case, and put in
doubt whether all the elements of the crimes charged were established.
View the full report @ http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11120/iragI4589.htm
304 See Amnesty International's press release on November 52006 ' Amnesty International deplores death
sentences in Saddam Hussein trial' @ http://news.amnesty.orgiindexlENGMDE140372006
305 N35
306 Article 14 (1), Article 14 (3)(a)-(g)
303
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verdict was delivered. The mode of execution further strengthened the claim of an unfair
process of the Dujali trial.
Apart from the practice of the fair trial provision, in theory the tribunal met
international standard for holding a fair trial 307 • Dujali trial had a public hearing by an
independent tribunal where Saddam Hussein exercised the right to retain defense
counsels and call witnesses. Saddam Hussein was found guilty after all the evidences
were considered and witnesses testified to that effect and his punishment was consistent
with the tribunal rules as well as the common practice of the country. The fact that
Saddam Hussein was brought to trial without being arbitrarily detained or executed is a
triumph for the notion of rule of law. The handling of the trial may have been
unsatisfactory to human rights standards in today's civilized world but it falls short of an
unfair trial.

Repairing the Justice system

"The effective reconstruction of the justice sector requires a coherent approach that
places equal emphasis on all its elements: police, prosecution, judiciary, and the
. I system,,308
correctwna

This comment of an expert involved in the reconstruction of East Timor and
Kosovo communicates the huge responsibility that the transitional authority faced in Iraq.
During political negotiations in a post conflict environment, regular criminal activities do
not necessarily cease. In case of Iraq there has been a significant escalation of looting,
307 According to the UDHR(Article 10, 11), ICCPR(Article 14, 15)( and ECHR (Article 6), the basic
components of fair trial include fair and public hearing in an independent tribunal, presumption of
innocence, right to defense counsel etc.
308 Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions
in Kosovo and East Timor 95 Am. J. Int'l. L (46-93) 2001 P 48
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vandalizing, robbery etc. The risk of loosing valuable documents of the government or
proof of abuses of the previous administration is also high. A working criminal justice
system was thus a priority from any point of view.

One of the pillars of criminal justice system is policing. In the beginning of
occupation, the coalition forces began policing for the courts without knowing anything
about the legal system. Among their obstacles was lack of Arabic language skill, which
prevented them from collecting any information from the arrested individuals309 . Also the
differences on the procedures made it almost impossible for the CPA to administer
policing functions properly. As one of the members of Judicial Reconstruction Assistance
Team (JRAT), a team created for assisting the CPA with reconstruction of criminal courts
in Baghdad commented,
"As far as the criminal justice system

III

Iraq, in March 2003 we knew it was

supposed to run according to a civil law system based upon a French model codified by
the Iraqi Penal code of 1969 and that criminal procedure was pursuant to the Criminal
Procedure Code of 1972. What we did not know was how these laws were in fact
followed.,,310 To remedy many such functional problems, the CPA went about
introducing changes in the system. Several political offenses were suspended together
with numerous procedural changes 311 . Lack of expertise in few staff members were

309 Address by Captain Travis Hall given at the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law's
conference of April 16, 2004, "From Autocracy to Democracy: The Effort to Establish Market
Democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan" published in Ga. J. Int'l & Compo L. 157-169 (2004-2005)
310 Id P 159
311 CPA Order 7 of9 June 2003 suspended many political offenses as well as capital punishment while
Memo no 3 amended the code of Criminal Procedure to allow rights to accused previously unavailable
under Iraqi law. For example, right against self incrimination, right to remain silent, right to be represented
by an attorney etc were introduced in Iraqi legal system. See CPAlORD/9 June 2003/07 and CPAlMEMl27
June 2004/03 @ http://www jraqcoalition.orgiregulations/index.html#Regulations
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tackled by a three-tier approach in UNTAET. Mandatory week long training prior to
appointments, ongoing trainings and monitoring through an international team of

The challenges of reconstructing the judicial system of a conflict ruined country are
also limitless. A similar scenario is found in testimony from East Timorese team of
reconstruction
"UNTAET staff members will never be able to forget the panorama of devastation
that awaited them upon their arrival in East Timor: most public and many private
buildings ruined and smoldering in the midst of what had once been towns and villages,
now all but abandoned by their former inhabitants, cut off from transport and
..
commUnlcatwn,
and 1ack'mg a governmenta"l superstructure. ,,313

One of the first priorities of that mission was to appoint judges and prosecutors who
are free from controversies. Consisting of three East Timorese and two international
experts led by an East Timorese of high moral ground a Transitional Judicial Service
Commission appointed candidates with necessary expertise and political acceptance
among the people314 .In the absence of a working broadcasting system, The UNTEAT
staff dropped leaflets over the territory to invite applications from the population. The
Iraqi reconstruction approach had been very different from any other similar cases
involving reconstruction. The differences in-attitude may have been the result of a unclear
mandate.
NIl p55-56
NIl P 50
314 NIl P 53
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Sharing his experience as CPA senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice John C.
Williamson in his drew a comparison between the mandate under UNMIK and Iraq
transitional authority 315. In the case of UNMIK justice agenda, justice and police powers
were reserved to the United Nations, management and control of the justice system was
firmly within the capacity of the international community, much like in the UNTAET. In
the Iraqi situation, the mandate was very unclear but to fill the power vacuum created by
the fleeing of senior government officials, CPA exercised full control over the system
rather than planned advisory role.

Under the same mandate, the T A went about introducing changes in the legal
education system of Iraq.

316They

identified programs including improving the

infrastructure of and materials in libraries, law school curriculum that has been
unchanged for thirty years, and organizing conferences about recent legal subjects and
fourth introducing clinical legal education. Rather than concentrating on the immediate
need, CPA went about changing the basic structure again.

Conclusion:
Considering the difficult environment on ground and cultural challenges faced by the T A
at the beginning of its reconstruction effort, it must be hailed as a praiseworthy effort.

315 Establishing rule of law in post conflict Iraq: Rebuilding the Justice System @ 33 Ga. 1. Int'l. & Compo
L. 229-244 (2004-2005),
316 In his Article Haider Ala Hamoudi, Toward a Rule Of Law Society in Iraq: Introducing Clinical
Legal Education into Iraqi Law Schools @ 23 Berkeley 1. Int'l. L 112-136 2005 mentions that he went to
Baghdad as a part of a team of educators sent by De Paul University's International Human Rights Law
Institute (IHRLI) to reform and improve legal education.
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Even with its shortcomings, the IHT can be considered as an important milestone for
international criminal law. Though Saddam Hussein faced less than fair trial, his
conviction is likely to serve as a deterrent for many abusive governments around the
world. International and regional experts may have played an important role in the
judicial reconstruction that was almost within the mandate. In this context I like to argue
that

1. The Iraqi tribunal met with international criminal prosecution standard:

A combination of international criminal law and Iraqi domestic procedure, this tribunal
may serve as a model for other countries willing to deal with past violations of
international humanitarian law. Involving international and regional experts may have
added to the legitimacy of the court. Abandoning the provision for capital punishment
and allowing longer period for appeal etc are few issues that need to be revisited. The
inherent problem of legitimacy of this court is precisely captured in the words of Adel
Safty,

"(The) Iraqi Governing Council has been appointed by the occupying power; it has
not been elected by the people. In this sense, it cannot claim to be competent to render
justice on behalf of the people of Iraq. Therefore, the criminal tribunal set up by the Iraqi
Governing Council does not meet the test of "independence and impartiality,,317
Whereas this court will have to carry the stigma even after being reestablished by
the elected assembly for years to corne, other countries may use the same model as
prerogative of sovereign power.

Cross posted from Danielle Tarin, Prosecuting Saddam and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq 45
Va. J. Int'l. L. 493 (2004-2005)
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2. The Trial of Saddam Hussein deviated from the goal of post conflict justice:
According to Bassiouni, post conflict justice includes " how the nation responds to the
systematic violations of the previous repressive regime, how it deals with the regime's
victims, and how it transforms yesterday's tragedies into lessons for tomorrow that will
enhance future deterrence and prevention,,318.
The motion to address the violations of Saddam government was followed by
establishing a tribunal that drew from international criminal legal jurisprudence only to
fall victim to partial conducts of individuals involved. It is unfortunate that despite
potential to enhance social reconciliation and promote unity among Iraqi citizens, the trial
of Saddam Hussein has served as an act of vengeance. Completely ignoring reparation for
the victims it rather fuelled clashes between ethnic groups. Rather than address past
wrongs, the trial created many of its own. Though it was a fair trial, the image of Saddam
Hussein being taunted at his final moments is likely to stay in people's mind as the legacy
of the tribunal. The trial failed to satisfy victims of the crimes as there was no initiative to
address reparation or reconciliation issues. It also failed to offer justice to victims of
Saddam's other cruel campaigns as he was hanged too soon without being held liable for
all his atrocities.

3. The TA acted within and beyond its authority:
While reconstructing the Justice system, the TA acted within its authority as it did not
modify any fundamental provisions of law previously existing in the country. Though it
suspended few provisions and introduced many new ones, it stayed within the recognized
318
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mandate. Introducing fundamental changes in the legal procedures, education and judicial
accountability are moves ultimately focused on a better and independent system of
judiciary.
Neutral international assistance, focused trial and most of all, waiting for a duly
elected government to set up the tribunal might have resulted in a better process for
holding Saddam accountable. Iraq may have been benefited from community courts or
informal dispute settlement forums as they have proved to be successful in many post
conflict environments 319 . Truth commission and other reconciliation forums for victims
both before the conflict and during the TA will serve the true purpose of post conflict
justice in Iraq.

See Jennifer Widner in Courts and Democracy in Post conflict Transitions: A Social scientist's
Perspective on the African Case @ 95 Am. J. Int'l. L. 64-75 2001 for a discussion of various African cases
in which the community courts played positive roles in rebuilding the society.
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Chapter VI
Transitional Authority's contribution to International
Legal Developments.
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Introduction:
Throughout the dissertation, I have tried to identify and answer legal questions arising
from the transitional authority in Iraq. In many instances, I stumbled upon a fact that
could not directly be explained or justified by any existing provision. From the beginning
of the invasion till the formation of an elected government experts argued over applicable
legal provisions. More than once I could neither agree nor dissent from those; rather felt
the need for another comprehensive rule. In this chapter, I briefly revisit the legal
inquiries, list the contribution they may have made to the international legal
jurisprudence and recommend development of international law to enrich future
transitional phases of post conflict territories.

Accountability for Violating Jus Cogens:
After evaluating arguments both for and against the legality of use of force in Iraq, I
reached a conclusion in the second chapter that the US led coalition forces' attack on Iraq
was illegal and a violation of jus cogens. As a careful student of international law, I take
into consideration the promise of maintaining international peace and security, the
obligation to refrain from use of force unless mandated through a Security Council
resolution or deemed necessary in conformity with the provisions of self defense. Though
the UN Charter is clear on the prohibition or permitted use of force, it is quiet on the
effect of a violation. The rule regarding the power of Security Council to take appropriate
measure in case of a violation has always overlooked violations of its members by
default. In case of the Iraq situation the Security Council was unable even to pass a
resolution condemning the violation of this peremptory norm of international law let
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alone suggesting any measure to hold the US and UK accountable. In contrast, Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 has met with adequate response from the Security Council
.This lack of consistent practice in addressing violations of basic tenants of the UN
Charter is a major flaw of international law today and needs sincere reexamination.

Rethinking the Security Council:

The Security Council is the most influential body in the world. Since the formation of the
UN, the five permanent members and ten members for every two year term have been
entrusted with the primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security. The veto
power of the permanent members has kept this council from acting in many crises
situation. While the members are virtually immune from any such measure their
preferences for other countries also come in the way of holding them accountable32o •
Besides this, the Security Council can be described as a less than democratic institution
as it does not represent the world population at any manner. The permanent members
reflect the reality of a post 1945 war rather than today. As democracy demands, the
General Council consisting of all members of the UN should have deciding power over
the Security Council. Inclusion of Latin American and African representatives may also
make the Security Council more democratic than its present form. The veto power must
be removed to avoid stalemate in conflict situations. In its current form, the Security
Council has become a platform for justifying military actions, economic sanctions and
peacekeeping operations in developing countries for violations of international norms
while overlooking similar violations of the permanent members or their allies.
For example, due to US position in Israeli -Palestinian conflict, the Security Council has had no
significant role in mitigating or resolving that conflict since 1967. For more on this see Security Council
page of Global Policy Forum http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/gensc.htm.
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Unfortunately the amendment allowing more countries membership to the Security
Council and abolish the veto power, must be passed by the Council itself. Though it
seems very unlikely at this point, for an effective UN this change must take place within.

Introducing framework for Post Conflict Transitional Governance:
As I discussed in the first chapter, the UN has been involved in administering post
conflict territories very recently. The increasing numbers of internal conflicts together
with UN interventions in many cases demand a comprehensive framework by which
governance of the post conflict territories can be carried out. The UN already has
representatives, legal and operational experts from different parts of the world who may
be appointed to this effect. From the Iraqi case, it is apparent that regional expertise is
especially helpful during nation building; the CPA and its reconstruction effort have
suffered because of the lack of language and cultural skills among the common people of
Iraq. The UN with its multinational experts can remove this flaw without much difficulty.
Another important matter in this regard is the acceptability of the UN among nations
which may act as a catalyst for restoring law and order situation.
There are arguments suggesting the occupation law to become part of transitional
period regulations and removing obstacles to make it more flexible in terms of
introducing new laws 321 . In this argument the commentator ignores the fact that UN
Resolutions and laws meant for violating parties do not carry the same weight. Whereas
UN presence is welcomed around the world, an occupying force struggles to justify its
authority in the occupied country. Calling UN intervention, which may very well be a

Breit H McGurk, Revisiting the Law of Nation Building: Iraq in Transition 45 Va. 1. Int'l. L 2004-2005
(451-463)
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result of popular demand similar as occupation undermines the sovereign consent
principle. Rather the trusteeship council of the UN seems to be a better institution to take
over this new phenomenon. Its experience of governing previous colonies until their
independence armed with regional and international experts, this suspended body may be
turned into the new transitional authority Council. Through this Council the UN will be
able to provide post conflict governance and security to affected regions while evaluating
their needs on a case by case basis. Up-to-date information on almost all sectors of
country and available resources necessary for governance put the UN on an advantageous
position for nation building responsibilities.

Revisiting Post conflict justice mechanisms:
Through the establishment of the tribunal, the transitional authority in Iraq has
contributed significantly in the development of international criminal jurisprudence for
post conflict territories. The Iraqi High Tribunal (llIT) tried individuals for international
crimes following national criminal procedures. Despite the inclusion of adequate fair trial
guarantees, this tribunal has been criticized for retention of death penalty and biased trial.
The combination of llIT structure, ICTY and ICTR model of victims and reparation unit
and ICC's gender sensitivity will offer satisfying justice for victims of conflict. The most
important aspect of such a system is that it does not require submitting to foreign or
international jurisdiction; rather remains within the sovereign power. It also serves as an
example of holding governments or individuals liable for past atrocities since such a

130

....................

-------------~

court, set up on ad hoc basis will not limit responsibility to any specific period like the
ICC 322 .

Making women matter:

Until recently international legal presence hardly included women in a decision making
capacity. Within the UN, there were no women judges in the ICJ, only a few women
were chosen as the highest executives of UN organs and fewer women joined as the
representatives of their countries. Similar situation exists in the leadership of countries
and in their parliaments. This scenario began to change with the passage of the statute of
ICC, where specific measures have been suggested to include women in all the positions
of the Court. In 2006 The General Assembly elected its first woman President323 after
1969 and the ICJ appointed its first female judge who went on to become President of the
Court324 . The Security Council has mandated countries to include women in decision
making in all aspect of peace processes 325 • In case of Iraq conflict, women have largely
been invisible in the decision making with the exception of US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice. The TAL and permanent constitution drafted during the transitional
authority did not warrant gender perspective in decision making other than providing
safeguard against discrimination on the basis of sex. International law has long ignored
the question of women's political participation nationally and internationally. Despite
passing of the 1325 resolution, states' did not pay much attention to it. The lack of
322'fhe ICC currently considers cases that happened on or after July 1 2002.
323 H.E. Sheikha Haya Rashed Al KhaIifa was elected President ofthe sixty-first session of the General
Assembly on 8 June 2006
324 Rosalyn Higgins of the UK has been a judge of the ICJ since 1995 and was elected President in 2006
325 SC/RES/1325 (2000) calls for inclusion of women in all decision making levels in relation to
prevention, resolution and management of conflict, protection of and respect for the human rights of
women and girls in conflict situations, gender training of all peace keeping personnel, formation of gender
units and inclusion of gender perspective for all post conflict reconstruction.
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monitoring or reporting mechanism and timetable to present progress made the resolution
more like a declaration without compulsory responsibility. The UN must take this issue
seriously and provide the world with better measures to safeguard women's interest and
secure their political participation at all levels of the government.

Conclusion
The events in Iraq opened a door for discussion on the effectiveness of international law .
Experts and students of international law are taking this opportunity to study its strengths
and weaknesses resulting in recommendations to improve the body of law. The
unfortunate subject of this case study, however, will have to live with the consequences
of the experiment. The unplanned nation building exercise is taking its toll on Iraqi
citizens, a complete account of which is still to unfold. The results of this invasion and
events afterwards will be felt in the country and in the region for years, if not decades to
come. The recent launch of the International Compact for Iraq326 as a joint initiative of
the Iraqi government and the UN may help to stabilize the country. The international
community must come up with a political solution for Iraq, not just promises of
reconstruction. The lesson from this case is simple; there is no alternative for
international cooperation in today's world. To make that effective, international law must
provide the basic framework for all legal actions.

UN Sponsored International Compact for Iraq is a five year national plan being launched in May 2007
where the SC permanent members, the UN, 08, OIC, The Arab League, Egypt, Bahrain and neighboring
states including Iran and Syria come together to help Iraq consolidate peace, sound governance and
economic reconstruction.
326
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